Unethical customer behavior: causes, consequences, detection and managerial implications by Yang, Zhao
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2017
Unethical customer behavior: causes, consequences, detection and
managerial implications
Yang, Zhao
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-147881
Dissertation
Published Version
Originally published at:
Yang, Zhao. Unethical customer behavior: causes, consequences, detection and managerial implications.
2017, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics.
Unethical Customer Behavior –
Causes, Consequences, Detection and Managerial
Implications
Dissertation
submitted to the
Faculty of Business, Economics and Informatics
of the University of Zurich
to obtain the degree of
Doktor der Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Dr. oec.
(corresponds to Doctor of Philosophy, PhD)
presented by
Zhao Yang
from China
approved in February 2017 at the request of
Prof. Dr. Rene´ Algesheimer
Prof. Dr. Martin Natter
Prof. Dr. Claudio J. Tessone
The Faculty of Business, Economics and Informatics of the University of Zurich hereby
authorizes the printing of this dissertation, without indicating an opinion of the views
expressed in the work.
Zurich, 15.02.2017
The Chairman of the Doctoral Board: Prof. Dr. Steven Ongena
To my parents Qigui and Qin, my wife Xue, and my son Chuanshuo:
This dissertation would never have been possible without your love.

Table of Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Summary of Study One (Chapter 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Summary of Study Two (Chapter 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Summary of Study Three (Chapter 4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 When Unethical Customers Have Beneficial Effects: A Theory of Retailer Response
to Unethical Customer Behaviors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 A Theory of Retailer Response to Unethical Customer Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 Study Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4 Data and Modeling Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.6 Retailer Response to Beneficial Unethical Customer Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.7 General Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3 Fraudulent behavior and statistical fraud detection techniques: A review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2 Definitions of fraud, cheating, dishonest, immoral, and unethical behavior . . . . . . . 56
3.3 Development of the research of unethical behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3.1 Standard economic perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3.2 Psychological perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3.3 Behavior economic perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.3.4 Neuroscientific perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.4 Studies on ordinary unethical behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.4.1 Why ordinary people engage in intentional unethical behavior. . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4.2 Why ordinary people engage in unintentional unethical behavior?. . . . . . . . 70
3.5 Overview of statistical fraud detection techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
I
3.6 Network science in fraud detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.7 Managerial implications of studies on unethical behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.7.1 How to reduce intentional unethical behavior? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.7.2 How to reduce unintentional unethical behavior? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.8 Conclusion and future steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4 A Comparative Analysis of Community Detection Algorithms on Artificial Networks . 93
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.2 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.3.1 The role of the network mixing parameter on accuracy and computing
time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.3.2 The observed mixing parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.3.3 The role of network size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.5 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5 Summary and Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
A Supplementary Information of Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
A.1 Identifying fraudulent users on the online shopping site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
A.2 VAR Model Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
A.3 Comparison of alternative VAR models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
A.4 Robustness check based on different definitions of fraudulent accounts . . . . . . . . . . . 131
A.5 The Ethics Position Questionnaire (Forsyth 1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
B Supplementary Information of Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
B.1 The role of the network mixing parameter on accuracy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
B.2 The role of network size on accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
II
List of Tables
1 Overview of the first study in the thesis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2 Overview of the second study in the thesis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3 Overview of the third study in the thesis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4 Results of the Granger-causality tests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5 Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6 Phillips-Perron unit root test results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7 Statistics of normal accounts and fraudulent accounts in the final sample. . . . . . . . . 28
8 Elasticity of the retailer in response to the unexpected positive one-standard-
deviation shock on fraudulent accounts (Panel A) and normal ones (Panel B). . . . 37
9 Effect separation: the comparison of direct effects (Panel A) versus indirect
effects (Panel B). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
10 Dynamic influence of fraudulent accounts on normal accounts after 5 time pe-
riods (Panel A) and 10 time periods (Panel B). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
11 Signs and durations of the impact of a one standard deviation shock. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
12 Overview of the articles mentioned in Section 3.3.1: Standard economic per-
spective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
13 Overview of the articles mentioned in Section 3.3.2: Psychological perspective. . 64
14 Overview of the articles mentioned in Section 3.3.3: Behavior economic per-
spective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
15 Overview of the articles mentioned in Section 3.3.4: Neuroscientific perspective. 67
16 Overview of the articles mentioned in Section 3.4.1: Why ordinary people en-
gage in intentional unethical behavior? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
17 Overview of the articles mentioned in Section 3.4.2: Why ordinary people en-
gage in unintentional unethical behavior? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
18 Overview of the articles mentioned in Section 3.5: Overview of statistical fraud
detection techniques. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
III
19 Overview of the articles mentioned in Section 3.6: Network science in fraud
detection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
20 Parameters of LFR benchmark graphs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
21 Indexes of the exponential function T ∝ Nα with the corresponding adjusted
R-squared values. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
22 Selection-order statistics. FPE, AIC, HQIC and SBIC are included.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
23 Comparison of VAR with AR and ARDL in terms of root-mean-square error
(RMSE) and median absolute error (MAE). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
IV
List of Figures
1 Theory of Retailer Response to Unethical Customer Behavior. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2 The VAR Modeling Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3 Formula of the VAR Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4 Development of Number of Accounts Over Time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5 Levels of Variables For Fraudulent and Normal Accounts Over Time: (a) Num-
ber of Logins, (b) Number of Proposed Transactions, (c) Number of Successful
Transactions, and (d) Revenue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6 The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an
unexpected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on normal accounts’ login
activity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7 The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an un-
expected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on the number of transactions
proposed by normal accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8 The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an un-
expected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on the number of successful
transaction made by normal accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
9 The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an
unexpected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on the amount of revenue
of normal accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
10 (lower row) The mean value of normalised mutual information depending on
the mixing parameter µ . (upper row) The standard deviation of the NMI as a
function of µ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
11 The mean value of the estimated number of communities delivered by different
algorithms over the real number of communities given by the LFR benchmark,
i.e., C¯/C, dependent on the mixing parameter µ on a log-linear scale. . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
V
12 (lower row) The mean value of the computing time of the community detection
algorithms (in seconds) dependent on the mixing parameter µ on a log-linear
scale. (upper row) The standard deviation of the measures on a log-linear scale. . 110
13 (lower row) The mean value of the mixing parameter estimated by the commu-
nity detection algorithms µ¯ dependent on the mixing parameter µ . (upper row)
The standard deviation of µ¯ dependent on µ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
14 (lower row) The mean value of normalised mutual information dependent on
the number of nodes N in the benchmark graphs on a linear-log scale. (upper
row) The standard deviation of the normalised mutual information dependent
on N on a linear-log scale.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
15 (lower row) The mean value of the computing time of the community detection
algorithms (in seconds) dependent on the number of nodes in the benchmark
graphs on a log-log scale. (upper row) The standard deviation of the computing
time on a log-log scale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
16 Recommendation for the choice of adaptable community detection algorithms. . . 118
17 Suggestion for the community detection process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
18 Stability of VAR model. Eigenvalue stability condition of the estimates of the
VAR model has been checked. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
19 The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an
unexpected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on normal accounts’ login
activity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
20 The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an un-
expected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on the number of transactions
proposed by normal accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
21 The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an un-
expected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on the number of successful
transaction made by normal accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
VI
22 The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an
unexpected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on the amount of revenue
of normal accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
23 The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an
unexpected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on normal accounts’ login
activity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
24 The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an un-
expected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on the number of transactions
proposed by normal accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
25 The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an un-
expected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on the number of successful
transaction made by normal accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
26 The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an
unexpected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on the amount of revenue
of normal accounts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
27 (lower row) The mean value of I joint dependent on the mixing parameter µ .
(upper row) The standard deviation of I joint dependent on µ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
28 (lower row) The mean value of Imax dependent on the mixing parameter µ .
(upper row) The standard deviation of Imax dependent on µ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
29 (lower row) The mean value of Isum dependent on the mixing parameter µ .
(upper row) The standard deviation of Isum dependent on µ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
30 (lower row) The mean value of Isqrt dependent on the mixing parameter µ .
(upper row) The standard deviation of Isqrt dependent on µ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
31 (lower row) The mean value of Imin dependent on the mixing parameter µ . (up-
per row) The standard deviation of Imin dependent on µ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
32 (lower row) The mean value of I joint dependent on the number of nodes N in the
benchmark graphs on a linear-log scale. (upper row) The standard deviation of
I joint dependent on N on a linear-log scale.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
VII
33 (lower row) The mean value of Imax dependent on the number of nodes N in the
benchmark graphs on a linear-log scale. (upper row) The standard deviation of
Imax dependent on N on a linear-log scale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
34 (lower row) The mean value of Isum dependent on the number of nodes N in the
benchmark graphs on a linear-log scale. (upper row) The standard deviation of
Isum dependent on N on a linear-log scale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
35 (lower row) The mean value of Isqrt dependent on the number of nodes N in the
benchmark graphs on a linear-log scale. (upper row) The standard deviation of
Isqrt dependent on N on a linear-log scale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
36 (lower row) The mean value of Imin dependent on the number of nodes N in the
benchmark graphs on a linear-log scale. (upper row) The standard deviation of
Imin dependent on N on a linear-log scale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
VIII
1 Introduction
Fraudulent behavior, also known as cheating, dishonesty and unethical behavior, has become a
major phenomenon representing substantial amounts of losses. It is an action that falls outside
of what is considered morally right or proper and it can happen among individuals, businesses,
professionals, politicians, and governments [19]. Volkswagen, for instance, was in the news for
unethical behavior on a massive scale. According to Ethics Alarms [7]: “Volkswagen, which
manufactures many of the beasts, devised and installed a code functioning as a “defeat device”
to sense when one of its diesel vehicles was being tested for nitrogen oxide emissions test.
Once a test was detected, the software would reduce torque and NOx emissions, while under
normal conditions, that is, when the vehicle was not being tested for emissions, the car would
be guided by a separate program that would increase acceleration, torque, and fuel economy.”
Another well-known example could be “Banking scandals”. UBS, the Union Bank of Switzer-
land, had a series of missteps in the recent past. Its Chief Executive, Oswald Grubel, resigned in
November 2011 as the bank faced a loss of $2.3 billion due to a low-level rogue trader conduct-
ing unauthorized trade by sidestepping the bank’s internal control mechanism and as the bank
had to pay $45 million in fines for having inadequate internal control systems, which enabled
the rogue trader to cheat [2].
Apart from these “famous” examples of unethical behavior, unethical customer behavior,
which is defined as disobeying the moral principles and standards that guide behavior of in-
dividuals or groups as they obtain, use, and dispose of goods and services [11], is also an
important aspect of unethical behavior in business. Common instances of unethical customer
behavior includes theft, price-tag swapping, use of items without purchase, and de-shopping,
etc. [18] Just based on these names, it’s not surprising that scholars and practitioners focus
mainly on negative aspects of unethical customer behavior. For instance, an earlier study [1]
claimed that “You will regret letting the wrongdoer off the hook!” and it sought to help man-
agers and executives by answering the following issues: (1) Where does bad behavior come
from? (2) How to manage the unethical consumer, and (3) What moderates unethical actions?
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This dissertation, however, points out that as bad character is not always tied to bad behavior,
the consequences of unethical customer behavior are not certainly to be negative. Therefore,
it’s necessary to shift the focus away from the rightness or wrongness of the customers’ be-
havior and to consider how retailers should respond to customers’ unethical behavior in more
comprehensive ways in order to benefit both customers and retailers.
The three independent papers in this dissertation are as follows.
The first paper is an empirical study. We employ longitudinal data from a Swiss online
retailer that was founded in late 2011. The data contains various perspectives of its customers,
e.g. their login activities, trading activities, purchasing activities, etc. Besides, we also receive
a list of customers who violate the policy of the retailer, i.e. behaving unethically. We use the
vector autoregressive models to reveal the connections between normal customers and fraud-
ulent ones, and further study the impact of fraudulent behavior on the retailer. Based on the
empirical analyses, we deliver generalizable results and provide managerial implications to the
existing marketing research and practices.
The second paper is a review study. We provide an overview of existing literatures in stan-
dard economics, psychology, behavior economics, and neuroscience on unethical behavior in
order to gain a deeper understanding of its causes and consequences. We then especially high-
light the studies related to ordinary unethical behavior, no matter whether it is intentional or
unintentional. After that, we briefly review different statistical fraud detections and elaborate
the application of network science, e.g. social network analysis, and community detection al-
gorithms, in fraud detection. In the end, we provide managerial recommendations to guide
managers in real business.
The third paper is a methodological study. In this work, we have employed the
Lancichinetti-Fortunato-Radicchi benchmark graphs to test eight state-of-the-art community
detection algorithms [10, 9, 8, 5, 16, 14, 12, 3, 15, 13]. We quantify the accuracy of various
community detection methods by using complementary measures. Based on simple network
properties, we provide guidelines that help to choose the most adequate community detection
algorithm for a given network. Community detection methods have drawn a lot of attentions
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in fraud detection due to the fact that they can be helpful in discovering groups of structurally
connected individuals. These methods, as the core of “community-based” anomaly detection
techniques, can detect the graph objects that are rare and differ significantly from the majority
of the reference objects in static and evolutionary networks in an unsupervised way [4, 17].
These graph objects can be nodes, edges, substructures, and the patterns of interactions.
1.1 Summary of Study One (Chapter 2)
In the first study, we probe the boundaries of the widely-held view about unethical customer be-
havior in two ways. First, we develop a more nuanced and broader picture of unethical customer
behavior by postulating that not all such behaviors are harmful. Some unethical actions can have
beneficial consequences. Second, we develop a theoretical framework of retailer response that
accommodates this nuanced view of unethical customer behavior and provides retailers with a
wider assortment of response options.
We analyze longitudinal data from a Swiss online retailer over 17 months using vector au-
toregressive models. We conclude that our research, together with our empirical analysis, com-
pellingly uncovers the counter-intuitive phenomenon of unethical consumer behavior having
predominantly positive consequences for the retailer and for other customers. It empirically
illustrates the observation made by Donaldson and Dunfee (1994, p.258) [6], that “the ethical
norms must be contoured to the rules of the specific economic practices and the notions of
fairness of participants.” Consequently, there is a strong need to consider unethical consumer
behaviors in retailing contexts in more nuanced and balanced ways. This allows to devise so-
lutions that are equally nuanced and lead to the best possible outcomes for customers and for
retailers as a whole, even when such actions do not fall strictly within the parameters set forth
by the influential moral philosophies.
This study is currently under the second round review at Journal of Retailing.
A brief overview of the this study is presented in Table 1, in which the research questions,
contributions, data, methods, and results are summarized.
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1.2 Summary of Study Two (Chapter 3)
In the second study, we first review various articles in standard economics, psychology, be-
havior economics, and neuroscience to understand the causes and consequences of unethical
behavior. We then provide an overview of recent development in studying ordinary unethical
behavior. After that we briefly review the statistical fraud detection techniques and highlight
the application of network science in fraud detection.
Although from the standard economics perceptive committing fraud does not have any in-
ternal cost, individuals do have internal costs while committing fraud as the evidences from
psychology and behavior economics suggest. These costs emerge because the actions an indi-
vidual undertakes, while engaging in cheating behavior, are inconsistent with the internal ethical
standards and moral principles. A growing body of research points to the fact that not only there
exist internal psychological costs while cheating, but also that the costs are different among in-
dividuals. Therefore, as every individual might have very different internal costs, there exists no
universal formula to predict precisely whether an individual commits fraud or not in a certain
situation. Moreover, due to self-serving biases and bounded ethicality, people are sometimes
not even aware of crossing ethical borders, and hence there are not many possibilities to reduce
such unethical behavior. We believe that further development in neuroscience could shed light
on understanding the underlying mechanisms behind these internal psychological costs, and will
help us to prevent, detect, and punish fraudulent behavior more efficiently. A brief overview of
the this study is presented in Table 2, in which the research questions, contributions, data, and
results are summarized.
1.3 Summary of Study Three (Chapter 4)
In the third study, we test eight state-of-the-art community detection algorithms on the
Lancichinetti-Fortunato-Radicchi benchmark graphs. We quantify the effects of the mixing
parameter and the network size on accuracy and computing time of community detection al-
gorithms. Our benchmark graphs have network sizes between 233 and 31,948 nodes, mixing
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parameters between 0.03 and 0.75, and a fixed average degree of 20.
We conclude that by taking both accuracy and computing time into account, the “Multilevel”
algorithm outperforms all the other algorithms on the set of benchmarks we have examined. We
further provide guidelines that help to choose the most adequate community detection algorithm
for a given network: For small networks, the community detection algorithms should be chosen
based on their accuracies. Among all the algorithms, Infomap, Label propagation, Multilevel,
Walktrap, Spinglass, and Edge betweenness algorithms are able to successfully uncover the
structure of small networks when the mixing parameter is small. With increasing value of
the mixing parameter, Infomap, Label propagation, and Edge betweenness algorithms are no
longer suitable. For large networks, the algorithms should first be able to detect the organiza-
tion of nodes in a reasonable time, and then have good accuracies. In this case, Infomap, Label
propagation, Multilevel, and Walktrap algorithms are the a priori choices. After that, by taking
the accuracy into account, Multilevel is superior to the other algorithms as it displays a perfor-
mance drop for a larger value of the mixing parameter. We also point out that Spinglass and
Multilevel algorithms can be used to get a rough idea about the value of the mixing parameter,
which is usually unobservable. Limited by the computing time required, Spinglass algorithm
cannot be applied on large networks.
This study has been published at Scientific Reports: Yang, Z., Algesheimer, R., & Tes-
sone, C. J. (2016). A Comparative Analysis of Community Detection Algorithms on Artificial
Networks. Scientific Reports, 6; doi: 10.1038/srep30750.
A brief overview of the this study is presented in Table 3, in which the research questions,
contributions, data, methods, and results are summarized.
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Table 1: Overview of the first study in the thesis.
Study 1: When Unethical Customers Have Beneficial Effects: A Theory of
Retailer Response to Unethical Customer Behaviors
Research questions Core contributions Data basis
What are the Investigating the effect Daily customer records
consequences of of unethical customer of a Swiss online
customer unethical behavior to the other shopping platform from
behavior to the other customers and the retailer. July 2012 to
customers, as well as Developing a theoretical November 2013;
to the retailer? framework of retailer List of fraudulent
How should the response that accounts flagged by the
retailer response accommodates a retailer; Weekly
to unethical more nuanced advertisement speeding;
customer behaviors? view of unethical Information of products
customer behavior. available on the
platform, etc.
Empirical methods: Vector autoregressive models; Survey
Main results:
- Based on the generalized impulse response function, unethical customer
behavior could produce positive effects for retailers and peers.
- Based on the survey, a majority of managers support keeping the unethical
customers even through their behavior is unethical.
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Table 2: Overview of the second study in the thesis.
Study 2: Fraudulent behavior and statistical fraud detection technique:
A review
Research questions Core contributions Data basis
What are the causes Various articles from Articles from the
and consequences different disciplines standard economics,
of unethical behavior? have been reviewed psychology, behavior
What techniques can to get a deeper economics, and
we use to detect understanding of neuroscience on
fraudulent behavior? unethical behavior. unethical behavior;
How should the Highlight the importance Articles from
managers do to of studies on ordinary computer science,
reduce the unethical unethical behavior. physics, and network
behavior of their Various articles from science
customers and different areas have on fraud detection
employees? been reviewed to techniques.
get an idea of fraud
detection techniques.
Highlight the importance
of network science
in fraud detection.
Main results:
- From the standard economics perceptive committing fraud does not have any
internal cost.
- Psychology and behavior economics suggest that individuals do have internal
costs while committing fraud. These costs emerge because the actions an
individual undertakes, while engaging in cheating behavior, are inconsistent
with the internal ethical standards and moral principles.
- The above-mentioned costs are different among individuals. Therefore, there
exists no universal formula to predict precisely whether an individual
commits fraud or not in a certain situation.
- Due to self-serving biases and bounded ethicality, people are sometimes not
even aware of crossing ethical borders.
- Further development in neuroscience might shed light on understanding the
underlying mechanisms behind these internal psychological costs.
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Table 3: Overview of the third study in the thesis.
Study 3: A Comparative Analysis of Community Detection Algorithms on
Artificial Networks
Research questions Core contributions Data basis
Which is the most Providing actual techniques LFR (Lancichinetti,
suited community to determine the most Fortunato & Radicchi)
detection algorithm suited community benchmark graphs.
in most circumstances detection algorithm.
based on observable Proposing that the
properties of the mixing parameter can
network under be an easily measurable
consideration? indicator of finding
the ranges of reliability
of the different algorithms.
Showing the dependency
with network size
focusing on both
the algorithm’s predicting
power and the effective
computing time.
Methods: Eight community detection algorithms available in the “igraph”
package: Edge betweenness, Fastgreedy, Infomap, Label propagation,
Leading eigenvector, Multilevel, Spinglass, and Walktrap.
Main results:
- For small networks, the community detection algorithms should be chosen
based on their accuracies.
- For large networks, algorithms should first be able to detect the organization
of nodes in a reasonable time, and then have good accuracies.
- By taking both accuracy and computing time into account, the “Multilevel”
algorithm outperforms all the other algorithms on the set of benchmarks we
have examined.
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2 When Unethical Customers Have Beneficial Effects: A
Theory of Retailer Response to Unethical Customer Be-
haviors1
Abstract
Conventional wisdom, supported by deontological ethics, suggests that retailers should extin-
guish unethical customer behavior when they discover it. We explore the boundaries of this
widely-held view in two ways. First, we paint a more nuanced picture by proposing that
when longer-term impact is considered, some unethical customer actions have beneficial conse-
quences. We verify this core postulate by using a longitudinal dataset, covering seventy weeks
and over 48,000 accounts, from a popular Swiss online retailer. Our results reveal that cus-
tomers registering multiple accounts in violation of the retailer’s policy comprise fewer than
11.5% of accounts, yet generate 27.5% of the retailer’s revenue. Their participation leads to
increased revenues for the retailer and increased engagement for other customers. Second, we
theorize that when made aware, retailers will respond to unethical customer behavior in ways
that accommodate this nuanced view. Supporting our prediction, a survey of retail managers
finds that a vast majority (80.9%) are inclined to let unethical customers continue. However,
ethical idealists are more likely to take a stand against unethical customers despite benefits ac-
cruing to the retailer.
key-words
Unethical customer behavior; marketing ethics; online shopping; loss prevention; consumer
fraud; gamification.
1Author Statement: This work has been done together with Rene´ Algesheimer, and Utpal Dholakia. It’s
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Rene´ and the financial support of the Jones Graduate School of Business, Rice University, to Utpal are gratefully
acknowledged. Zhao Yang is the 1st author, Rene´ Algesheimer is the 2nd author, and Utpal Dholakia is the 3rd and
corresponding author.
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2.1 Introduction
“Rationality in economic ethics is bounded in three ways: by a finite human capac-
ity to assess facts, by a limited capacity of ethical theory to capture moral truth, and
by the plastic or artifactual nature of economic systems and practices.”
(Donaldson and Dunfee 1994, p. 258.)
Unethical customer behavior, defined as instances where consumers intentionally behave
in a deceptive and dishonest ways that violate widely held moral principles, or disobey the
retailer’s rules or policies, takes many forms [11, 29, 32, 37, 54, 55]. Common instances include
shoplifting, returning purchased items for a refund after use, accidentally or willfully damaging
in-store merchandise, and providing false or misleading personal information such as Social
Security number or telephone number [6, 24, 47]. Unethical behavior by some customers can
produce significant ramifications for retailers and other consumers.
Given the potential severity of adverse consequences, unsurprisingly, much of the scholarly
and popular attention has focused on negative aspects of unethical customer behavior and how
to deal with it. Researchers have considered the antecedents and mechanisms through which
customers decide to behave unethically, the range of negative consequences that occur, and ways
of mitigating unethical behavior and its negative effects. This work yields recommendations
for prevention or deterrence of unethical customer behavior through such means as impulse
resistance, education, affecting social norms, and administering punishments (see Mazar and
Ariely 2006, and Vitell 2003, for reviews [38, 54]).
In this paper, our central thesis is that such a perspective, although often practically useful,
provides a narrow, and sometimes misleading, characterization of the consequences of cus-
tomers’ unethical behavior and considerations of how retailers should respond to them. We
probe the boundaries of the widely-held view about unethical customer behavior in two ways.
First, we develop a more nuanced and broader picture of unethical customer behavior by pos-
tulating that not all such behaviors are harmful. Some unethical actions can have beneficial
consequences. Second, we develop a theoretical framework of retailer response that accom-
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modates this nuanced view of unethical customer behavior and provides retailers with a wider
assortment of response options.
Our theory makes the provocative and novel assertion that in some cases, an initial unethical
customer action will have positive longer-term effects on the retailer and on other customers.
Using a longitudinal dataset, covering seventy weeks, and over 48,000 accounts, from a popular
Swiss online retailer, we verify this core postulate of our theory. In conducting the study, we
extend investigations of unethical customer behavior beyond shorter-term decisions and actions
usually examined with controlled lab experimentation [7, 33, 37, 48, 20] to a longitudinal field
study of its consequences on a retailer’s actual revenues and on its customers’ actual purchase
behaviors and activity over a period spanning more than a year. Our study is conducted in an
online retailing context involving discounted purchases and customer-to-customer interactions
around collecting and trading virtual cards. We utilize a list of accounts identified as behaving
unethically (registering multiple accounts on the site by providing false information) through a
robust multiple-stage verification method [8].
We also directly address the challenging question of how retailers should react when they
encounter unethical customer behavior with predominantly longer-term positive effects. In such
cases, retailers face a difficult trade-off: Should they stick to practice and prosecute or fire
unethical customers even if doing so means hurting revenues and adversely affecting other
customers’ activities? Or should they ignore or even encourage such unethical behaviors? To
the extent that the net effects on the retailer and other customers are positive, we argue that
retailers will lean towards encouraging beneficial unethical behaviors.
We investigate this issue by conducting a survey of retail managers asking them how they
would deal with this situation. The results reveal that consistent with our prediction, a majority
of surveyed retail managers (80.9%) are inclined to let these unethical customers continue.
However, those with greater ethical idealism are more likely to take a stand against unethical
customers despite accruing benefits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop our theo-
retical framework, and describe its key postulates. Next, we describe our main study’s setting
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and explain how unethical consumer behavior is defined, detected, and tracked by the retailer.
Our modeling approach is explained next followed by the results. After that, we present the
results of a second study conducted with retail managers. We conclude with a discussion of the
contributions and implications of our work.
2.2 A Theory of Retailer Response to Unethical Customer
Behavior
In understanding how retailers conceive of, and deal with unethical customer behaviors, two
opposing moral philosophy perspectives provide a useful starting point. The ethics literature
distinguishes between deontological and teleological perspectives regarding what constitutes
ethical behavior and how others should react to it [30, 27, 54]. A deontological perspective,
exemplified by Kantian ethics [31], focuses solely on the inherent rightness or wrongness of an
action and disregards its consequences. This focus arises from shining the light on the individ-
ual’s motives for acting with the ultimate goal of behaving in a certain way for the right reasons.
Contrarily, in assessing the ethicality of a particular behavior, a teleological perspective, with
conceptual foundations in the Utilitarianism School developed by British philosophers Jeremy
Bentham and David Hume [5], focuses on the cumulative positive and negative effects of the be-
havior’s consequences and not on the nature of the behavior itself. It argues that a behavior can
be considered as moral and should be encouraged as long as its total beneficial consequences
outweigh its harmful consequences.
Interestingly, the conventional wisdom in the retailing literature as well as retailer practice
itself endorses a deontological view. Retailers see all unethical customer behaviors as dys-
functional [2, 4, 47] and harmful to the bottom line, partly because they focus on the behavior
itself which is more readily visible rather than the consequences of the behavior that are often
harder to discern. Not surprisingly, this leads to the belief that any time unethically behaving
customers are detected, retailers should use any and all means at their disposal to curtail the
behavior. The more “wrong” the consumer’s action in the sense of crossing ethical and legal
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lines, the more strictly the retailer should deal with it [25, 26, 49]. To address the problem of
shoplifting, for example, retailers commonly employ security personnel called “loss prevention
officers.” They not only prosecute shoplifters who are caught but also sue them for damages in
civil court [4, 10]. This conventional view of dealing with unethical customers by prosecuting
them is depicted in the top of Figure 1, marked in gray. It endorses the view that to the extent
consumers behave unethically, such behaviors should be curbed by the retailer through legal
and financial deterrence. Implicit in these actions is the idea that unethical customer behavior
causes harm.
We advance the core postulate that, when deciding how to respond, the retailer should look
beyond the unethical act itself, and consider longer-term consequences of the action, not only
for itself but also for its other customers. In line with a teleological ethical perspective, and
contemporary views of customer relationship management [36], we argue that customer behav-
iors that violate retailer policy and are marked as unethical can have a range of consequences,
both negative and positive. What is more, these consequences stretch out over the customer’s
relationship with the retailer. In deciding how to respond to unethical behavior, it is important
to distinguish between consequences for the retailer (e.g., effects on sales), consequences for
the unethical customer (e.g., how the unethical action affects subsequent behavior), and conse-
quences for other customers (e.g., how they are affected by the unethical customer’s behavior).
These different consequences are shown at the bottom of Figure 1.
Such a formulation of retailer response to unethical customer behavior requires two condi-
tions to be met. First, the customer’s unethical behavior should be innocuous enough to warrant
a subdued or even a positive retailer response. When an unethical behavior is serious (e.g.,
assaulting a fellow customer in a store, stealing outright, etc.), the retailer must respond ag-
gressively without teleological considerations. In other words, a range of retailer responses
that support doing nothing or encouraging unethical customers under a teleological perspective
presupposes that the customer’s transgression was minor. The second condition is that the cus-
tomer’s unethical behavior should lead to measurable positive consequences for the retailer and
other customers.
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Figure 1: Theory of Retailer Response to Unethical Customer Behavior.
Psychological research provides evidence for both these conditions. Concerning the first
condition, a growing body of literature over the past two decades provides evidence of “ordi-
nary unethical behavior” [18], by showing that not only do significant numbers of individuals
behave unethically in many everyday activities, but also that most such behaviors are small in
both scale and seriousness [29, 38, 42, 54]. The reasons lie in the nuanced decision calculus that
instigates unethical behavior. Individuals balance the need to profit from behaving unethically
with the need to maintain a positive self-view. Consequently, the extent of their unethical be-
havior is limited to minor infractions – actions seen as relatively innocuous (that is, not causing
substantial harm to anyone), and where such actions can be easily justified or rationalized to
oneself [32, 37] or where they can “strategically forget” the ethical principles involved [50].
Based on this research, we may surmise that retailers are likely to frequently encounter cus-
tomers who conduct minor ethical transgressions. But can such actions have beneficial effects?
There is emerging psychological research that has begun to study positive effects of one’s
unethical behavior on others. Erat and Gneezy introduce the concept of a “pareto white lie” in
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which both the liar and others benefit [16]. They offer the example of a physician knowingly
lying and giving a placebo to patients, knowing fully well that such a medicine will have no
pharmacological effect on the patient, but may confer psychological benefits leading to positive
outcomes. The medical literature argues that such lying by medical practitioners constitutes
“benevolent deception”, and is morally defensible to the extent that it improves the patient’s
care and increases likelihood of positive patient outcomes [28]. However, no studies, to our
knowledge, have considered potential benefits of unethical customer behaviors in retailing or
marketing contexts.
We theorize that in relational settings such as typical retailing environments, an initial un-
ethical action by the customer may open the door for him or her to behave in legitimate ways on
an ongoing basis. Furthermore, such activities may add substantial value to both the retailer and
other customers, outweighing the harm of the person’s initial unethical action. When a range
of possible outcomes from the negative to the positive is possible, the retailer must respond ac-
cording to the consequences. Thus, as shown in the figure, once the consequences are measured
and understood, the retailer will choose to prosecute the customer, fire him or her, do nothing,
or even encourage the customer depending on the positivity and negativity of the consequences
[15].
Our theory of retailer response to unethical customer behavior makes two empirically
testable postulates that we investigate in this paper. The first postulate, that forms the focus
of our main study, is that customers behaving unethically at the outset can contribute positively
to the retailer and to other customers when their behaviors are considered and evaluated over
the longer-term. The second postulate is that when retailers understand the potential positive
longer-term ramifications of customers’ unethical behavior, they will be likely to adopt a more
measured response to this behavior than is predicted by a strictly deontological ethical view that
are implicitly endorsed by many retailers.
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2.3 Study Setting
This study is conducted in Switzerland and employs longitudinal data from a Swiss online
retailer that was founded in late 2011. Focused primarily on retail shopping for generating
revenue, the site provides its customers with an engaging shopping experience by using social
gaming and price promotions [57]. These features serve dual purposes of distinguishing the site
in a crowded retailing environment, and encouraging customers to visit regularly. Customers of
this site actively collect and trade virtual cards associated with each offer. In return, they receive
discounts corresponding to the number of cards they have collected at the time of purchase.
Since its founding, the firm’s customer base has grown at an annual rate of 114%. By the end
of 2014, it had more than 100,000 active customers.
The Retailer’s Business Model
The site sells a variety of goods and services. Products offered over the course of this study
included the Samsung Galaxy, the Apple iPad, Sony Xperia, various branded clothes and hand-
bags, and services such as pre-paid salon and spa services, restaurant meals, and trips. When
an offer is first listed on the site, a set of ten virtual cards (numbered from 1 to 10) is generated
for the offer. Each card corresponds to a discount voucher that offers a ten percent discount off
the item’s listed price. Customers have the option of either purchasing the item at the full listed
price or collecting cards associated with the offer to bring down the price they will have to pay.
As the customer collects more cards associated with an offer, the discount received off the list
price increases additively. Thus, if the customer is able to collect all ten cards, they receive the
listed item for free. The customer is free to redeem all cards they have collected at any time
during the offer period and receive a discount corresponding to the number of collected cards.
Most offers last 4-6 weeks, giving customers with time to collect and trade cards with each
other.
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The Role of Virtual Trading Cards
Customers can obtain virtual trading cards in a number of ways. First, when new users join
the site, after registering and logging for the very first time, they receive three randomly chosen
cards. Second, to encourage regular visits, each account receives two free randomly chosen
cards on a daily basis for simply logging in. Note that the customer must log in at least once
during the day to receive these free daily cards. On days that they do not log in, they don’t
receive any cards. If they log in more than once on any given day, they still receive only two
cards. Third, to augment these sources, customers have the ability to purchase cards from the
site at the price of 2 Swiss francs (CHF) per card. These cards are generated randomly; the
customer cannot specify or order a particular card for purchase. It is important to note here that
there is no difference in the generation process for cards that are given for free and those that are
paid for by customers. All cards are generated using the same random process. However, for
an offer, each of the ten cards is generated with a different probability and has a different cap,
so that some cards are quite common while others are very rare. The total number of released
cards also varies from one offer to the next depending on the number of items that the site wants
to sell and the stipulations of the manufacturer. Because of these characteristics, customers may
find that for one particular offer, some cards are easy to get whilst others are extremely difficult.
Fourth and importantly, customers can trade cards they possess with other site members.
This gamification feature is the site’s key differentiator when compared to other shopping and
discount voucher sites. Specifically, collecting and trading cards with each other to earn greater
discounts on a particular offer not only introduces a social aspect to the customer’s experience
but it also involves the explicit use of gamification to produce excitement. Both enhance cus-
tomers’ engagement with the site and with each other. To encourage card trading, a search
engine is prominently displayed on the site’s main page. Using this engine, customers can find
other members with a specific card they are looking for. They can send an offer for the desired
card through the site’s messaging system and negotiate once contact is established and if there
is mutual interest in a trade. If a customer desires one particular card intensely, he or she can
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offer multiple cards in return. Finally, once a relationship is established between customers,
they can trade cards with each other directly without using the site’s search engine. There is no
limit to how many cards the transaction parties can submit to a trade.
Definition of a Fraudulent Account
By lowering the price that the customer has to pay for the offered item by 10%, each trading
card has a significant, measurable financial value. Specifically, the financial value of a card
equals a tenth of the offer’s value. However, due to varying availability of cards, scarcity drives
the perceived financial value for card collectors. To provide equal chances to its customers of
receiving all cards, and to comply with Swiss lottery law, the retailer requires each customer to
register when joining the site. It stipulates that each person can open only one account, and the
account must be associated with only that person. These stipulations are clearly described in the
retailer’s published terms and conditions since its inception and are also explained to customers
in simple language in email communications.
In this research, we study the effects of customers who violate this policy, i.e. behaving
unethically. In the analysis that follows, we define fraudulent users as customers who misrepre-
sent themselves to take advantage of free cards offered to each user (upon registration and when
logging in daily), thereby winning a stronger bargaining position in the trading card game. They
do this by opening multiple accounts using different mobile or VOIP telephone numbers (e.g.,
such as those belonging to their family or friends) to confirm each of their accounts. Such a
misrepresentation is considered as fraudulent behavior not only because it violates the retailer’s
terms and conditions, but because it could precipitate a potential monetary loss for other le-
gitimate customers by decreasing their likelihood of winning a particular trading card offered
[8].
From the customer’s viewpoint, there are at least four advantages to opening and maintain-
ing multiple accounts. First, the more accounts one has, the more daily free cards one receives,
increasing the chances of winning multiple cards associated with the same offer and earning a
higher cumulative discount. Additionally, because they have more free cards and continue to
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get them at a faster rate, individuals with multiple accounts have the flexibility to trade extrav-
agantly, offering multiple cards in exchange for a particular rare card. Second, having multiple
accounts also increases the person’s chances of receiving rare cards having greater value for
trades. Third, the more cards a customer collects, the easier it is to recognize a card’s scarcity
value, leading to a position of strength in negotiating trades. Fourth, customers with multiple ac-
counts can trade and exchange cards between their own accounts. For these reasons, the retailer
sees multiple accounts as unfair to its legitimate customers who maintain a single account.
Identifying Fraudulent Accounts
To identify fraudulent customers, the retailer employs a multi-step procedure. Since its in-
ception in late 2011, it has used Google Analytics. As part of gathering behavioral data from
shoppers, the site serves cookies to customers’ computers and mobile devices, which are then
used to detect fraudulent accounts (multiple accounts accessed from the same device; see “Sup-
plementary Information of Chapter 2” for details regarding identifying fraudulent accounts).
Accounts are observed for their fraud potential based on activity. They are flagged if two (or
more) accounts with similar profiles routinely log on from the same IP address within a few
minutes of each other.
Once accounts are flagged, the retailer contacts the account owners by telephone to deter-
mine whether it was the same person associated with the different accounts (to rule out legiti-
mate same-IP users such as spouses or partners, children, room-mates, etc.). With this manual
process, the retailer is able to continually modify and improve the accuracy of its fraud poten-
tial algorithm. If this process fails to clear the customer, at this stage, the account is flagged as
fraudulent and the retailer begins a protocol for having the customer delete multiple accounts.
First, it will contact accounts identified as fraudulent by email, and next, it will do so through
in-platform messages to issue warnings. If these two communications also fail, in the third stage
of the protocol, the retailer confronts the account owner with their suspicion, and invites them
to respond within a limited period of time (e.g., four weeks) before terminating their accounts.
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2.4 Data and Modeling Approach
The retailer provided us with longitudinal data for 48,782 unique accounts that engaged in
3,083,936 logins, 2,022,666 total transactions, and 316,564 successful transactions, along with
the retailer’s weekly advertisement spending during the time period from 4 July 2012 to 22
November 2013. There are a total of 19,416 customer purchases during this time that included
both buying trading cards (at a price of 2 CHF per card) and purchasing products and services
(with or without accompanied card redemptions). During this period, the retailer presented a
total of 544 different offers on its site, with product list prices ranging from 11 CHF to 6,882
CHF (M = 338.2 CHF). Due to site maintenance and hardware upgrade issues there was a
period of 18 days during which the site was shut down during January 2013. Important for our
purposes, among these 48,782 accounts, we also received a list of 5,576 unique accounts flagged
as fraudulent by the retailer (accounts that failed to clear the manual verification process).
We use vector autoregressive models to study the effects of fraudulent accounts on normal
accounts. The impact of fraudulent customer behavior on the site on other user’s behavior using
is modeled the following approach. First, we test for potential endogeneity among variables
related to fraudulent and normal accounts. Next, we specify a vector autoregressive model
(VAR) accounting for endogeneity and the fully interacting dynamic system of endogenous
variables. After that, we estimate the generalized impulse-response function to study the impact
of fraudulent accounts on normal ones. Finally, we compare our VAR model to a number of
alternative models. Figure 2 describes our modeling framework graphically, with the arrows in
the figure indicating the links between endogenous and exogenous variables.
To measure customer activity, we employ the number of logins, the number of proposed
transactions, and the number of successful transactions. In the number of proposed transac-
tions, we have only considered the transaction requests proposed by the accounts, and excluded
those received from others. This is due to the fact that customers cannot prohibit trading requests
from others; thus received transaction requests do not reflect any activity on the customer’s part.
However, in the number of successful transactions, we have counted both transactions proposed
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Figure 2: The VAR Modeling Framework.
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and received by the accounts because for successful transactions, customers are actively in-
volved on both sides of the transaction. Revenue is measured as the amount of money spent on
the site. The retailer’s advertisement spending, the seasonal dummy variables, days of the week,
and time trends were included as controls. We transformed the weekly advertisement spending
into daily level by assuming that the advertisement spending is equally distributed throughout
the week. Additionally, lagged effects are included in the model (See “Supplementary Infor-
mation of Chapter 2” for details regarding the lag-order selection). As we are investigating the
interactions of groups of fraudulent accounts and normal accounts, we aggregate all individual
accounts into the fraudulent accounts group and the normal accounts group. The analysis is
conducted on a daily level.
It is important to test for the presence of endogeneity between customer activity and the
site’s revenue performance. As Figure 2 indicates, we anticipate that the activity of fraudu-
lent accounts will affect the activity of normal accounts and the change in normal accounts’
activity will correspondingly lead to changes in fraudulent accounts’ activity and will there-
fore indirectly impact the change in normal accounts’ activity. We anticipate similar patterns
of causality between the revenue of fraudulent accounts and the revenue of normal accounts,
and between the activity and the revenue. The links represented in Figure 2 can be tested by
investigating which variables Granger cause other variables [21, 23].
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In essence, the Granger causality test examines whether one variable temporally causes
a second variable after accounting for the history of the second variable. In the absence of
controlled experimentation, such a “temporal causality” is the closest proxy for causality that
can be obtained from time-series data. It is important to point out that a wrong choice for the
lag-order in the test may erroneously conclude the absence of Granger causality [22]. Because
we are applying these tests to investigate the need for modeling a full dynamic system, we are
not interested in whether variable X causes variable Y at a specific lag, but in whether we can
exclude that X Granger causes Y at any lag [53]. Therefore, we conduct the Granger-causality
tests on each pair of variables for all the lags up to 30 with the null hypothesis that the variables
do not Granger cause other variables included in the analysis. The minimum p-values for the lag
that has the highest significance for Granger causality are reported in Table 4. In summary, the
results from the Granger-causality tests indicate the need to consider the full dynamic system,
as in a VAR model, and to account for the indirect effects of different actions.
Table 4: Results of the Granger-causality tests.
Results of the Granger Causality Tests
(Minimum p-Value Across 30 Lags)
Dependent
Variable Is
Granger-
Caused by n PT t n ST t n Lt n T t f PT t f ST t f Lt f T t
n PT t — .000 .000 .000 .066 .067 .101 .000
n ST t .000 — .000 .002 .002 .002 .000 .000
n Lt .000 .000 — .000 .001 .000 .000 .000
n T t .000 .000 .000 — .000 .000 .000 .000
f PT t .000 .000 .000 .000 — .000 .000 .000
f ST t .000 .000 .000 .000 .017 — .000 .000
f Lt .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 — .000
f T t .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 —
Notes: n PT t is the number of transactions proposed by normal accounts at day t; n ST t is the number
of successful transactions made by normal accounts at day t; n Lt is the number of logins of normal
accounts at day t; n T t is the amount of revenue of normal accounts at day t; f PT t is the number of
proposed transactions of fraudulent accounts at day t, f ST t is the number of successful transactions of
fraudulent accounts at day t; f Lt is the number of logins of fraudulent accounts at day t; f T t is the
amount of revenue of fraudulent accounts at day t.
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Next, to determine whether each of the variables in our dataset is stable (i.e. whether it
fluctuates temporarily around a fixed mean or trend) versus evolving (i.e. whether it can deviate
permanently from the previous level), we apply the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test [14] and the
Phillips-Perron test [46] to the time series. The null hypothesis of both tests is that the variable
contains a unit root (the variable is not stationary), and the alternative is that the variable is
generated by a stationary process. Tables 5 and 14 provide the results of these tests respectively,
including the test statistics and the Mackinnon approximate p-value for the test statistics. These
results reject the null hypothesis at the common significance levels, confirming that all variables
appear stationary after controlling for trend and lagged difference. Thus we can perform our
model estimations with the variables in levels.
Table 5: Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test results.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (trend, lags(2))
(The p-value is in the last column)
Variables Test 1% 5% 10% Mackinnon
statistics Critical Critical Critical approximate
value value value p-value for Z(t)
n PT t -5.835 -3.981 -3.421 -3.130 .0000∗∗∗
n ST t -5.92 -3.981 -3.421 -3.130 .0000∗∗∗
n Lt -5.776 -3.981 -3.421 -3.130 .0000∗∗∗
n T t -10.176 -3.981 -3.421 -3.130 .0000∗∗∗
f PT t -6.103 -3.981 -3.421 -3.130 .0000
∗∗∗
f ST t -5.61 -3.981 -3.421 -3.130 .0000
∗∗∗
f Lt -4.696 -3.981 -3.421 -3.130 .0007
∗∗∗
f T t -9.098 -3.981 -3.421 -3.130 .0000
∗∗∗
Significance codes: 0 “∗∗∗”, 0.001 “∗∗”, 0.01 “∗”, 0.05 “ ”
Encouraging results of the tests for both endogeneity and unit root allow us to proceed to
specify and formalize the VAR model in Figure 3 to study the relationships between variables
of fraudulent accounts and normal accounts (see “Supplementary Information of Chapter 2” for
details regarding the stability test of the VAR model):
Where n PT t is the number of transactions proposed by normal accounts at day t; n ST t is
the number of successful transactions made by normal accounts at day t; n Lt is the number
of logins of normal accounts at day t; n T t is the amount of revenue of normal accounts at
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Table 6: Phillips-Perron unit root test results.
Phillips-Perron test (trend, lags(2))
(The p-value is in the last column)
Variables Test 1% 5% 10% Mackinnon
statistics Critical Critical Critical approximate
value value value p-value for Z(t)
n PT t -7.476 -3.981 -3.421 -3.130 .0000∗∗∗
n ST t -6.98 -3.981 -3.421 -3.130 .0000∗∗∗
n Lt -6.956 -3.981 -3.421 -3.130 .0000∗∗∗
n T t -18.59 -3.981 -3.421 -3.130 .0000∗∗∗
f PT t -7.743 -3.981 -3.421 -3.130 .0000
∗∗∗
f ST t -7.134 -3.981 -3.421 -3.130 .0000
∗∗∗
f Lt -5.176 -3.981 -3.421 -3.130 .0001
∗∗∗
f T t -18.026 -3.981 -3.421 -3.130 .0000
∗∗∗
Significance codes: 0 “∗∗∗”, 0.001 “∗∗”, 0.01 “∗”, 0.05 “ ”
Figure 3: Formula of the VAR Model.
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day t; f PT t is the number of proposed transactions of fraudulent accounts at day t, f ST t is
the number of successful transactions of fraudulent accounts at day t; f Lt is the number of
logins of fraudulent accounts at day t; f T t is the amount of revenue of fraudulent accounts at
day t; adspendingt is the advertising spending of the retailer at day t; season1t to season3t are
seasonal dummies; do fWk1t to do fWk6t are day of the week dummies; #dayst and #log(days)t
are time trends.
In this model, the revenue, the login, the number of proposed transactions, and success-
ful transactions made by fraudulent accounts and normal accounts are endogenous they are
explained by their own past and the past of the other endogenous variables [13]. The vec-
tor of exogenous variables includes advertising spending, seasonal dummy variables, day of
week effect dummy variables, and time trend variables. The off-diagonal terms of the matrices
α ij,k ( j 6= k) estimate the direct and cross-over effects among all endogenous variables, and diag-
onal elements ( j = k) estimate auto-regressive effects. The terms of the matrices γ ij,l represent
the impact of exogenous variables controlling for ad spending, seasonality, day of the week, and
time trends.
2.5 Results
We begin by first reporting straightforward model-free evidence regarding the importance of
fraudulent accounts to the retailer. After that, we provide estimates of the vector autoregressive
model.
Summary Statistics
The descriptive statistics for our sample are provided in Table 7. By comparing the totals and
averages in the table, we can conclude that the fraudulent accounts are among the site’s most
active accounts. 11.43% of accounts are fraudulent yet they contribute 27.66% of the site’s
revenues. Customers with fraudulent accounts appear to be more willing to login, to propose
trade transactions, and to spend money on the site. Moreover, they are more successful in con-
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summating trade transactions, as indicated by the higher ratio for successful transactions than
proposed transactions in Panel B of table 7. They log in 5 times as often as normal accounts,
propose 3.6 times as many transaction requests, achieve 6.1 times as many successful transac-
tions, and spend 3 times as much as normal accounts.
Table 7: Statistics of normal accounts and fraudulent accounts in the final sample.
Panel A: Total Numbers
Variables Normal Fraudulent Total
accounts accounts accounts
Number (% of sample) 43,206 5,576 48,782
(88.57%) (11.43%)
Number of logins 1,877,782 1,206,154 3,083,936
(60.89%) (39.11%)
Number of proposed 1,382,994 639,672 2,022,666a
transactions (68.37%) (31.63%)
Number of successful 353,454 279,674 316,564b
transactions (55.83%) (44.17%)
Spending on the site (CHF) 579,284.4 221,476.35 800,760.75
(72.34%) (27.66%)
Panel B: Average Numbers
Variables Normal Fraudulent Fraud Accts/
accounts accounts Normal Accts
Average number of logins per 43.46 216.31 4.98
account
Average number of proposed 32.01 114.72 3.58
transactions per account
Average number of successful 8.18 50.16 6.13
transactions per account
Average spending on the site 13.41 39.72 2.96
per account (CHF)
aIn the number of proposed transactions, only transaction requests proposed by the accounts are consid-
ered. Customers cannot prohibit trading requests from others, but these requests do not constitute the
customer’s own activity.
bIn the number of successful transactions, both transactions proposed and received by the accounts are
included because in a successful transaction, the customer is actively involved on both sides of the trans-
action.
Figure 4 shows the cumulative number of all accounts, fraudulent accounts, and their ra-
tio over time. In the panels of the figure, once an account was flagged as fraudulent, it was
considered as fraudulent from then on. From the right panel showing the ratio of cumulative
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fraudulent accounts to all accounts, we can surmise that the retailer was able to detect fraudu-
lent accounts quickly early on in its existence. As it employed protocols of emailing and then
warning fraudulent customers, the rate of new fraudulent accounts was brought under control.
The ratio stabilized and then declined as time passed.
Figure 4: Development of Number of Accounts Over Time.
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Results of the VAR Model: generalized impulse response function
In order to examine and understand the time trends in our data, we plot the number of logins,
proposed transactions, successful transactions, and the retailer’s revenue for the fraudulent and
normal accounts over time. After testing a number of different functions, the time trends could
be best fitted with t plus log(t), where t is the number of days. Figure 5 provides the raw data
and the fitted curves.
In the figure, fraudulent accounts are represented as red nodes (type = 1) and normal ac-
counts are represented as blue ones (type = 0). The green curve is the fitting of normal accounts
and the orange one is the fitting of fraudulent accounts. Both curves are fitted based on the
function y = t + log(t). The two black vertical lines represent the 18-day period during which
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Figure 5: Levels of Variables For Fraudulent and Normal Accounts Over Time: (a) Number of
Logins, (b) Number of Proposed Transactions, (c) Number of Successful Transactions, and (d)
Revenue.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
the site was down for service maintenance. Since there is no distinct effect of the maintenance
on customer login activity, transaction activities, and purchasing behavior, we do not consider
it further.
As it is difficult to interpret the coefficients estimated by the VAR model directly [51], we
employ impulse response functions (IRFs) to simulate the impact of a change (over its baseline)
in one variable over time on the full dynamic system, thus representing the net result of all
modeled actions and reactions. The original IRFs are the “orthogonalized” impulse responses,
where the underlying shocks to the VAR model are orthogonalized using the Cholesky decom-
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position or forecast error variance decompositions before impulse responses. However, this
approach is sensitive to the causal ordering of variables in the VAR model [35]. To solve this
issue, we apply the generalized impulse response function which does not ask for a causal or-
dering among the endogenous variables but instead uses information available in the residual
variance-covariance matrix of the VAR model [13, 45, 34].
Figure 6 displays the results of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact
of an unexpected change in fraudulent accounts’ login activity, the number of transactions pro-
posed by fraudulent accounts, the number of successful transactions made by fraudulent ac-
counts and the revenue resulting from fraudulent accounts on login activity of a normal account.
We transform the IRFs into elasticity to show the impact of the positive shock (Trusov, Bucklin,
and Pauwels 2009) as follows: First, the IRF analysis yields to the change in number of the vari-
able, ∆Y , in response to a positive one-standard-deviation shock to another variable, X. Second,
we calculate the standard deviation for X (denoted as σx), the mean values for Y (denoted as Y¯ ),
and the mean values for X (denoted as X¯). Finally we get the arc elasticity as shown in Equation
1:
ηarc =
∆Y
σx
× X¯
Y¯
(1)
Based on the results, we can conclude that: (1) An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent
accounts’ login times will yield an increase of 159 logins on normal accounts’ login activity.
The corresponding elasticity is 0.1291, i.e. the normal accounts’ login activity will increase
by 12.91% in response to a positive one-standard-deviation shock to fraudulent accounts’ login
activity. This positive effect will decrease over time and disappear after 5 days; (2) An unex-
pected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ number of proposed transactions will yield an
increase of 119 units on normal accounts’ login activity. The corresponding elasticity is 0.0653
(6.53%). This positive effect will dissipate to zero after 4 days; (3) An unexpected positive
shock on fraudulent accounts’ number of successful transactions will yield an increase of 119
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logins on normal accounts’ login activity. The corresponding elasticity is 0.0865 (8.65%). This
positive effect will last for 4 days before it becomes insignificant; and (4) an unexpected posi-
tive shock on fraudulent accounts’ amount of revenue will not yield any significant response on
normal accounts’ login activity. Similarly, Figures 7, 8, and 9 show the same four impulses on
the number of proposed transactions of normal accounts, the number of successful transaction
made by normal accounts, and the revenue of normal accounts, respectively.
Suppose further that the login and transaction activities of the platform consist of activities
of fraudulent accounts and normal accounts, and the retailer’s revenue equals to the sum of the
revenue from fraudulent accounts and normal accounts, we can also calculate the corresponding
retailer elasticity as shown in Equation 2:
ηarc =
∆X +∆Y
σx
× X¯
X¯ + Y¯
(2)
Table 8 summarizes the retailer’s elasticity in response to the unexpected positive 1 stan-
dard deviation shock on fraudulent accounts and normal ones, separately. We can conclude
that: (1) with respect to platform activities (number of logins, number of proposed transactions,
and number of successful transactions), fraudulent accounts consistently contribute more than
normal accounts, and (2) with respect to retailer revenue, fraudulent accounts make a less, but
still significant contribution compared to the normal ones.
Results of the VAR Model: Restricted impulse response functions
As the generalized impulse response functions represent the net effect of the full chain of events
set in motion by the shock, it is of interest to specify its direct effects versus the indirect ones. To
do the effect separation, we adapt the idea of “conceptual experiments,” in which one adds re-
strictions that only allow some variables to react, while keeping other variables at their baseline
level [43, 44].
To obtain the long term direct effect of fraudulent accounts on normal ones, we estimate
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Figure 6: The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an unex-
pected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on normal accounts’ login activity.
In the figure, the blue curve shows the impact and the red dotted curves represent the one standard
deviation confidence interval for the impact. The x-axis is the number of days. The y-axis is the number
of login times.
An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ login times will yield an increase of 159 login
times on normal accounts’ login activity. The corresponding elasticity is 0.1291. This positive effect will
decrease over time and disappear after 5 days.
An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ number of proposed transactions will yield an
increase of 119 login times on normal accounts’ login activity. The corresponding elasticity is 0.0653.
This positive effect will go to zero after 4 days.
An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ number of successful transactions will yield an
increase of 119 login times on normal accounts’ login activity. The corresponding elasticity is 0.0865.
This positive effect will last for 4 days before it becomes insignificant.
An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ amount of revenue won’t yield any significant
response on normal accounts’ login activity.
separate impulse response functions by restricting variables to remain unaffected by the corre-
sponding shocks on fraudulent accounts. As the restricted impulse response functions and the
generalized impulse response functions are based on the same estimated coefficients from the
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Figure 7: The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an un-
expected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on the number of transactions proposed by
normal accounts.
In the figure, the blue curve shows the impact and the red dotted curves represent the one standard
deviation confidence interval for the impact.
The x-axis is the number of days. The y-axis is the number of proposed transaction times.
An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ login times will yield an increase of 208 transac-
tion times on normal accounts’ number of proposed transactions. The corresponding elasticity is 0.2209.
This positive effect will decrease over time and disappear after 5 days.
An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ number of proposed transactions will yield an
increase of 257 units on normal accounts’ number of proposed transactions. The corresponding elasticity
is 0.1844. This positive effect will go to zero after 5 days.
An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ number of successful transactions will lead to 215
more proposed transactions of normal account. The corresponding elasticity is 0.2045. This positive
effect will last for 5 days before it becomes insignificant.
An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ amount of revenue won’t yield any significant
response on the number of normal accounts’ proposed transactions.
same VAR model, the conceptual experiments allow us to separate the direct effects from the
overall effects.
In the first conceptual experiment (E1), we allow every variable to have long term effects
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Figure 8: The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an unex-
pected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on the number of successful transaction made
by normal accounts.
In the figure, the blue curve shows the impact and the red dotted curves represent the one standard
deviation confidence interval for the impact.
The x-axis is the number of days. The y-axis is the number of successful transaction times.
An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ login times will yield an increase of 53 transaction
times on normal accounts’ number of successful transactions. The corresponding elasticity is 0.2203.
This positive effect will decrease over time and disappear after 5 days.
An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ number of proposed transactions will yield an
increase of 64 units on normal accounts’ number of successful transactions. The corresponding elasticity
is 0.1797. This positive effect will go to zero after 6 days.
An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ number of successful transactions will lead to 64
more successful transactions of normal account. The corresponding elasticity is 0.2381. This positive
effect will last for 6 days before it becomes insignificant.
An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ amount of revenue won’t yield any significant
response on the number of normal accounts’ successful transactions.
on its own, and “fraudulent accounts’ login activity” to have long term effects on the other
variables. This experiment isolates normal accounts’ login activity from all the other variables
except for itself and the fraudulent accounts’ login activity. It therefore allows us to estimate
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Figure 9: The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an unex-
pected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on the amount of revenue of normal accounts.
In the figure, the blue curve shows the impact and the red dotted curves represent the one standard
deviation confidence interval for the impact.
The x-axis is the number of days. The y-axis is the amount of revenue in 0.01 CHF.
An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ login times won’t yield any significant response
on normal accounts’ revenue.
An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ number of proposed transactions won’t yield any
significant response on normal accounts’ revenue.
An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ number of successful transactions won’t yield any
significant response on normal accounts’ revenue.
An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ amount of revenue will yield an increase of 25,155
units in the amount of revenue of normal accounts. The corresponding elasticity is 0.2167. This positive
effect will become insignificant in about 3 days.
the direct effect of fraudulent accounts’ login activity on normal ones’ login activity. The sec-
ond conceptual experiment (E2) adds long term effects of “number of transactions proposed
by fraudulent accounts” on the other variables except for “fraudulent accounts’ login activity.”
It allows us to study the direct effect of the number of transactions proposed by fraudulent
accounts on that proposed by normal accounts. The third conceptual experiment (E3) adds
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Table 8: Elasticity of the retailer in response to the unexpected positive one-standard-deviation
shock on fraudulent accounts (Panel A) and normal ones (Panel B).
Panel A: A Shock on Fraudulent Account Levels
Effects on Retailer # Logins # Proposed # Successful Revenue
Transactions Transactions
# Logins 17.79% — — —
# Proposed Transactions — 27.82% — —
# Successful Transactions — — 34.9% —
Revenue — — — 40.25%
Panel B: A Shock on Normal Account Levels
Effects on Retailer # Logins # Proposed # Successful Revenue
Transactions Transactions
# Logins 12.19% — — —
# Proposed Transactions — 19.77% — —
# Successful Transactions — — 18.25% —
Revenue — — — 58.39%
“number of successful transactions made by fraudulent accounts” to have long term effects on
the other variables except for “fraudulent accounts’ login activity” and “number of transactions
proposed by fraudulent accounts”. This experiment represents the direct effect of the number of
successful transaction made by fraudulent accounts on that made by normal accounts. Finally,
the fourth conceptual experiment (E4) adds long term effects of fraudulent accounts’ amount
of revenue on normal accounts’ login activity, number of transactions proposed by normal ac-
counts and fraudulent accounts, and normal accounts’ amount of revenue. This conceptual
experiment is based on the assumption that purchasing behavior might stimulate one’s login
activity and encourage customers to propose more trading requests but might not directly lead
to more successful transactions. It shows the direct effect of fraudulent accounts’ revenue on
normal accounts’ revenue. Table 9 summarizes the comparisons of direct effects versus indirect
effects for these conceptual experiments. The former is estimated by the structural decompo-
sition impulse response functions and the latter equals to the difference between the net and
direct effects. The results from the conceptual experiments indicate that in three of the four
cases, direct effects have larger effects than indirect effects. The results also show that indirect
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effects, which pass through the other variables, also play an important and significant role.
Table 9: Effect separation: the comparison of direct effects (Panel A) versus indirect effects
(Panel B).
Panel A: Direct effects
Structural decomposition impulse response functions
A Shock on Fraudulent Account Levels
Effects on Retailer # Logins # Proposed # Successful Revenue
Transactions Transactions
(E1) (E2) (E3) (E4)
# Logins 114 — — —
# Proposed Transactions — 115 — —
# Successful Transactions — — 48 —
Revenue — — — 24,043
Panel B: Indirect effects
Difference between the generalized impulse response functions and the
structural decomposition impulse response functions
A Shock on Fraudulent Account Levels
Effects on Retailer # Logins # Proposed # Successful Revenue
Transactions Transactions
# Logins 45 — — —
# Proposed Transactions — 142 — —
# Successful Transactions — — 16 —
Revenue — — — 1112
Results of the VAR Model: Generalized forecast error variance decompo-
sition
In order to show that fraudulent accounts represent a substantial part of performance variance of
normal accounts, we employ the generalized forecast error variance decomposition [45, 52, 41]
to show the relative impact of shocks on normal accounts initiated by fraudulent accounts over
10 time periods. Table 10 summarizes the results of the relative impact after 5 and 10 time peri-
ods, separately. Based on these results, we can conclude that: (1) fraudulent accounts’ activities
(number of logins, number of proposed transactions, and number of successful transactions)
have substantial impact on normal accounts’ activities, and fraudulent accounts’ revenue has
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significant impact on normal accounts’ revenue; (2) The impacts of fraudulent accounts on
normal ones are stable over time.
Table 10: Dynamic influence of fraudulent accounts on normal accounts after 5 time periods
(Panel A) and 10 time periods (Panel B).
Panel A: Relative impact of shocks initiated by each individual endogenous
variable of fraudulent accounts after 5 time periods
Effects on Normal # Logins # Proposed # Successful Revenue
Accounts (%) Transactions Transactions
# Logins 7.542 4.350 4.048 0.667
# Proposed Transactions 5.803 9.186 5.898 0.502
# Successful Transactions 6.877 9.987 9.532 0.603
Revenue 0.745 0.651 0.235 10.374
Panel B: Relative impact of shocks initiated by each individual endogenous
variable of fraudulent accounts after 10 time periods
Effects on Normal # Logins # Proposed # Successful Revenue
Accounts (%) Transactions Transactions
# Logins 7.666 4.345 4.102 0.687
# Proposed Transactions 5.846 9.166 5.953 0.499
# Successful Transactions 6.927 9.939 9.575 0.609
Revenue 0.746 0.652 0.273 10.361
Overall, the set of results depicted in the tables and figures indicate that fraudulent accounts
consistently have a positive effect on normal accounts. This is true for all three measures of
activity, the number of logins, the number of proposed transactions and the number of success-
ful transactions. Furthermore, the effects are persistent, generally remaining significant for up
to four to five days after the shock is introduced. The effects of the revenue earned from the
fraudulent accounts are less consistent, with the only significant effects being observed on the
revenue earned from normal accounts, with the effect lasting about three days. Table 11 summa-
rizes the signs and durations of these effects. These results provide evidence that the activities
and revenue of fraudulent accounts on the shopping site has positive effects on the activity lev-
els of the platform as well as on the revenue of the firm (See “Supplementary Information of
Chapter 2” for the comparison of VAR model and two other autoregressive models).
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Table 11: Signs and durations of the impact of a one standard deviation shock.
A Shock on Fraudulent Account Levels
Effects on Normal # Logins # Proposed # Successful Revenue
Accounts Level Transactions Transactions
# Logins +, 5 days +, 4 days +, 4 days Insignificant
# Proposed Transactions +, 5 days +, 5 days +, 5 days Insignificant
# Successful Transactions +, 5 days +, 6 days +, 6 days Insignificant
Revenue Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant +, 3 days
Robustness Checks of the Results
The analysis reported thus far is based on the 5,576 accounts that the retailer identified as fraud-
ulent after completing the manual check and failing to clear the account. All of them were sent
the warning email in the first step of the protocol to curb this behavior. However, to test the
robustness of our results, we also repeated this analysis using two other, narrower definitions
of fraudulent accounts: (1) the subset of 4,345 accounts that were flagged as fraudulent and
not only received the email warning but also an in-game warning, and (2) the subset of 3,749
accounts that received all three warnings: email, the in-game warning, plus the confrontation
message. The results of the robustness checks are reported in “Supplementary Information of
Chapter 2”. These analyses show that although the effects of fraudulent accounts on normal
ones become less significant, and the durations of the effects become shorter under these nar-
rower definitions of fraudulent accounts, we can still observe the positive impact of fraudulent
accounts on normal ones.
Through this study, we sought to validate a key postulate of our theory, that when a longer-
term perspective is taken, initial unethical customer actions can sometimes produce positive
effects for retailers and peers. Our longitudinal study revealed that at the individual account
level, activities of fraudulent accounts, including the number of logins, the number of card
trading transactions that they proposed to other customers, and the number of trades that they
successfully executed all had positive effects on the activities of normal customers. We found
a similar positive pattern of results for the impact of fraudulent accounts’ purchasing behavior
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on that of normal accounts’ purchasing behavior. Our results also indicate that the fraudulent
accounts’ purchasing behavior had a positive effect on retailer revenue.
2.6 Retailer Response to Beneficial Unethical Customer Be-
havior
Our theory of retailer response posits that when the retailer realizes the effects of customers’
unethical behavior are beneficial for itself and its other customers, in accordance with teleo-
logical rather than deontological ethics, it will tend to encourage the behavior. Ethics research
also suggests the possibility of differences in response based on ethical ideologies [17]. This
line of work distinguishes between ethical relativism and idealism. The chronic trait of ethical
relativism is the extent to which the manager rejects universal moral rules because he or she
believes that there are many different ways to look at any particular moral issues. Ethical ideal-
ism, on the other hand, focuses on moral beliefs that the achievement of desirable consequences
will always be obtained when the appropriate actions are performed [17, 3].
Prior research has shown that such people tend to rely on their ethical ideology in how
they interpret and respond to questionable actions. Studies show that relativism is less able to
predict practical ethical decisions, whereas idealism is more diagnostic (see Davis, Anderson
and Curtis 2001, Mudrack and Mason 2013, for a review [12, 40]). Consistent with these
findings, we expect that a manager’s ethical idealism will predict the decision to ban multiple
account customers, but trait relativism will not do so.
Survey-Based Study of Managers’ Decision Making
To conduct a test of our predictions, we conducted a survey of retailers. Specifically, we wished
to determine the extent to which they would favor retaining the beneficial unethical customers
vs. firing them, expecting that a majority would favor retention. We also sought to test our
hypothesis that ethical idealism but not relativism would predict the decision to fire beneficial
unethical customers. Study Method and Measures. Study participants were 136 US-based
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owners or managers of small and medium-sized retail businesses (39.6% female, Mean age =
40 years, SD = 12.0 years) who participated in the online survey in exchange for a $10 e-gift
card for Amazon.com. They were recruited using a small business owner e-mail address list to
participate in “an academic study of how managers evaluate unethical customer behavior.” The
mean annual revenue of the businesses was $500,000 – $1 million. Participants were instructed
that they would first be given a description of the situation involving a specific type of unethical
customer behavior and then asked how they would deal with it. Everyone read the following
scenario:
“Company X is an online firm that sells a variety of products at good prices. Its
business model is based on a gamification approach in which customers trade vir-
tual cards with each other. Each offered product has ten different virtual trading
cards associated with it. For an offer, the more unique cards customers collect, the
greater is the discount they enjoy on its purchase. If they collect all ten cards, they
receive the product for free.
Each customer account receives two random cards daily, and can purchase more
random cards at a nominal price. They can also trade cards they possess with one
another to collect cards for the product that they want to buy.
Because each customer account receives two free cards every day, Company X pro-
hibits its customers from registering multiple accounts on the site. This prohibition
is clearly stated in its terms of agreement with customers.
However, a small but significant portion of the customers (around 6%) violate this
policy anyway and sign up for multiple accounts on the company’s site. By doing
this, the customers get more free cards each day, and have more cards to use and
trade with others.
Company X’s research shows that these customers are also its most engaged and
profitable customers. They generate more than a quarter of the firm’s revenue and
their activity leads to positive effects for the firm and contributes to increased site
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activity by other customers who have a single account.
The managers of Company X are unsure about what to do with these customers.
On the one hand, they are violating the firm’s policy and are engaging in fraudu-
lent behavior. On the other hand, their behaviors benefit both the firm and other
customers.”
After reading this scenario, participants answered the question “If you were a Senior Man-
ager of Company X, what would you do?” in an open-ended way. Next, they were asked, “If
you were a senior manager at Company X, to what extent would you ban these multiple-account
customers from the site vs. leave them alone?” Their responses were elicited on a 9-point scale,
anchored with 1 = “I would leave these customers alone” and 9 = “I would work very hard to ban
these customers from my site.” After a short filler task, participants completed Forsyth’s (1980)
20-item Ethics Position Questionnaire to assess their idealism and relativism (see “Supplemen-
tary Information of Chapter 2”). The two sub-scales showed adequate reliabilities (Idealism α
= .86, Relativism α = .83), and were each averaged and mean-centered for use in the analy-
sis. Finally, they completed demographic measures by indicating their age, gender (male = 0,
female = 1), education, and annual revenue of their business. We used these four variables as
controls in the analysis.
We coded respondents’ answers to the open-ended question of what they would do if they
were a senior manager into either “Keep the unethical customers” or “Get rid of the unethical
customers.” Responses in the “keep customers” category included:
“Allow them to continue. As management has created the rules they have the lat-
itude by which to enforce or make exceptions. As no harm is being done, except
potentially to the company who is exposed to more giveaways, this is within their
purview.”
“I would not do anything to discourage or obstruct this behavior. If anything, I
might either change the company’s Terms of Agreement, or even try to implement
changes that formalize what these 6% of users are already doing. For example,
43
increasing the number of cards that customers receive based on the age or activity
level of their account.”
“I wouldn’t do anything but I would keep an eye on the percentage of these cus-
tomers.”
Responses in the “get rid of customers” category included:
“I would stop those unethical actions that violates the terms of the agreement.”
“I would give them warning and terminate them if they keep this activity.”
“I would confront the so called violators to avoid lawsuits within the company.
“I would either modify the policy for everyone, or enforce the current policy and
penalize the people not following the rules.”
Of the sample, 19.9% of respondents indicated that they would get rid of the unethical
customers, whereas the majority or 80.1% of respondents indicated that they would keep the
unethical customers. The two dimensions of ethical ideologies, idealism and relativism, were
uncorrelated to each other (r = .012, p = .89). We ran hierarchical multiple regressions in which
the respondents’ stated extent to which multiple-account customers would be banned vs. left
alone was regressed on the controls, relativism, and idealism. The controls were entered in the
first block, relativism was entered in the second block, and idealism in the third block. Results
showed that the controls explained 15.7% of the variance in the decision to ban vs. leave
multiple account customers alone with age (β = .187, p = .027), gender (β = .264, p = .002),
and education (β = -.176, p = .035) all predicting this variable significantly. Adding relativism
did not increase explained variance at all (β = -.003, p = .973) in the second block, but idealism
was a significant predictor (β = .258, p = .004) with explained variance of 20.9% (∆R2 = 33%
over the baseline). As expected, greater idealism of the business owner was associated with
greater insistence on banning multiple-account customers from the site, but relativism did not
affect the decision.
These findings show that consistent with our theorizing, a majority of managers support
keeping the customers even though their behavior is unethical. However, the ethical ideology
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of the managers involved plays a role such that ethical idealists are more likely to insist on the
firm deontological stance of banning multiple-account customers.
2.7 General Discussion
Research Contributions
The extant retailing literature and practice adopt a fairly rigid and narrow perspective on un-
ethical customers that is focused on loss prevention and deterrence. Against this backdrop, we
introduced a theoretical framework that shifts the focus away from the rightness or wrongness of
the customer’s action, and towards understanding its’ consequences, especially over the longer-
term, before deciding how to respond to it. While acknowledging that many unethical customer
behaviors are too serious to warrant leniency, we argue that in today’s digital, information-
dense, privacy-conscious, and customer relationship-oriented environment, many retailers have
adopted conservative, tradition-based policies of what is allowed and not allowed by customers
[39]. Even when a customer violates such policies, thus committing an ethical transgression, its
consequences may not always negative. In fact, when longer-term implications of such actions
are considered, retailers and non-transgressing customers may both benefit as was the case with
the retailer in our study.
We believe our broader theoretical perspective on retailer response introduces pragmatism,
based on a teleological ethical perspective, into the retailer’s decision making process. It is
likely to benefit retailers of all stripes in re-thinking how they conceive of, and deal with, their
customers’ unethical behavior. The theory introduced here also opens the door for a deeper
study of retailers’ policies directed towards customers and their effects on customer behav-
ior and retailer outcomes. We can easily imagine that similarly beneficial effects could occur
to retailers from return policy violators [56], at least from some customer segments; but our
speculation needs to be validated through future research. Another issue worth exploring is to
specify the conditions that lead unethical behaviors to produce positive retailer outcomes such
as those we postulated and found.
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Why did unethical customer behavior have positive effects?
Our study’s setting has at least three characteristics that are likely to have contributed to the
positive effects of unethical customer behavior. It is worth discussing these conditions because
they provide a better understanding of where else such effects may occur, and may help to
deepen our proposed theory in future research.
The first condition is that the customer’s unethical action concerns an information good that
the retailer produced and distributed with negligible variable costs [1]. Specifically, the retailer
incurred minimal incremental costs for registering multiple accounts of unethical customers,
and for generating additional trading cards for them because of their multiple logins2 . Another
example where this condition may obtain is a customer rewards program that offers points to
enhance a customer’s status within a social media platform. Here too, it is likely that multiple
accounts opened by a customer would enhance activity and produce more revenue-generating
opportunities (e.g., through advertising) without adding commensurate costs to the marketer.
The second reason for beneficial effects is the possibility that the customer’s initial unethical
action of registering multiple accounts propelled the customer’s relationship with the retailer
into a different, more active trajectory. With greater incentives (multiple daily free cards) and
resulting benefits accrued from trading cards and making discounted purchases, having multiple
accounts led to greater activity, which accumulated over time. Thus, the initial unethical action
directly encouraged latter customer engagement, and generated greater revenues for the retailer.
It is noteworthy that the unethical behavior concerned only initial registration; later trading
and purchase behavior was in line with that of other ethical customers (albeit with multiple
accounts). The active trading of the fraudulent customer boosted the amount of login and trading
activity of other customers, benefitting their relationships with the retailer as well. For online
retailers reliant on advertising-based revenue models, greater customer engagement will have
additional payoffs.
2We note that the rarity of the generated cards was determined independently and was not influenced in any
way by fraudulent accounts. The presence of fraudulent accounts simply impacted which customers won the rare
cards, but did not result in more rare cards being generated.
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The third reason for positive effects is likely to be the fact that there was no obvious harm
to any identifiable victim — either other customers or the retailer itself — from the unethical
customer’s actions [19]. As mentioned earlier, the most significant potential harm from multiple
registrations is that it reduced ethical customers’ chances of winning rare cards. But the results
indicate that: (a) either the customers did not notice this, (b) found it to be unimportant, or (c)
the greater number of cards available for trade on the site made up for any perceived detriment,
or a combination of the above3.
2.8 Conclusion
A more practical and actionable compromise that bridges the gap between these two philosophi-
cal perspectives is that the retailer should change its user policies so that an individual customer
can maintain and utilize more than one user profile on the site without the need for multiple
telephone numbers or email addresses. This is consistent with the approach used by sellers of
information goods such as Netflix which allows its customers to readily share their account with
others and create up to five different user profiles and customize preferences within each profile
[9]. For this retailer, such flexibility would lead to the customer’s behavior that is currently seen
as surreptitious and ethically questionable to be clearly seen as morally acceptable under both
deontological and teleological philosophies.
To conclude, our research compellingly uncovers the counter-intuitive phenomenon of un-
ethical consumer behavior having predominantly positive consequences for the retailer and for
other customers. It empirically illustrates the observation made by Donaldson and Dunfee
(1994, p. 258) [15], that “the ethical norms must be contoured to the rules of the specific eco-
nomic practices and the notions of fairness of participants.” Consequently, there is a strong need
to consider unethical consumer behaviors in retailing contexts in more nuanced and balanced
ways and to devise solutions that are equally nuanced and lead to the best possible outcomes
for customers and for retailers as a whole, even when such actions do not fall strictly within the
3We note that the retailer did not publicize these customers’ fraudulent behavior at any time during the study
period (or since then) to the best of our knowledge. All communications and warnings to unethical customers were
conducted on an individual basis and discreetly.
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parameters set forth by the influential moral philosophies.
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3 Fraudulent Behavior and Statistical Fraud Detection Tech-
niques: A Review4
Abstract
Fraudulent behavior is a serious problem all over the world and occurs in practically every busi-
ness. It has become a major phenomenon representing substantial amounts of losses. From
banks to E-commerce, fraudsters keep on finding failures in the existing systems, which makes
fraud detection techniques an important and highly necessary field of research. In this pa-
per, the authors review the literature in standard economic, behavioral ethics, psychology, and
neuroscience on unethical behavior in order to understand its causes and consequences. Subse-
quently, we focus on studies related to ordinary unethical behavior. Furthermore, various fraud
detection techniques are reviewed, in which we especially highlight the application of network
science to fraud detection. Managerial implications as well as the possible future directions of
the above-mentioned researches are discussed in the end.
3.1 Introduction
“Your Honor, for many years up until my arrest on December 11, 2008, I operated
a Ponzi scheme through the investment advisory side of my business, Bernard L.
Madoff Securities LLC, which was located here in Manhattan, New York at 885
Third Avenue. I am actually grateful for this first opportunity to publicly speak
about my crimes, for which I am so deeply sorry and ashamed. As I engaged in
my fraud, I knew what I was doing was wrong, indeed criminal. When I began the
Ponzi scheme I believed it would end shortly and I would be able to extricate myself
and my clients from the scheme. However, this proved difficult, and ultimately
4Author Statement: This is a working paper together with Manuel Schnurrenberger, Alexandre Guinand, and
Rene´ Algesheimer. It has not yet been submitted to any journal. Zhao Yang is the 1st and corresponding author,
Manuel Schnurrenberger is the 2nd author, Alexandre Guinand is the 3rd author, and Rene´ Algesheimer is the 4th
author.
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impossible, and as the years went by I realized that my arrest and this day would
inevitably come. I am painful aware that I have deeply hurt many, many people,
including the members of my family, my closest friends, business associates and
the thousands of clients who gave me their money. I cannot adequately express
how sorry I am for what I have done. I am here today to accept responsibility for
my crimes by pleading guilty and, with this plea allocution, explain the means by
which I carried out and concealed my fraud.” (Bernard L. Madoff )
When it comes to fraud, people are likely to think about Enron, WorldCom, and Bernard
Madoff, etc. This is simply due to the fact that media reports only the most sensational cases
and huge corporate scandals. In the above-mentioned cases, Enron and WorldCom are two well-
known corporate scandals [100, 115], and Bernard Madoff together with his Ponzi Scheme is a
famous sensational case [114]. All of them have had damaging consequences to the society.
Indeed, fraudulent behavior is a serious problem all over the world and occurs in practically
every business. According to the global fraud report of 2015/2016 [85], despite that companies
make greater and more sophisticated efforts to combat fraud, it remains a big business threat
that cannot be completely eliminated. This annual report claimed that fraud has continued to
increase, with three quarters of companies reporting they have fallen victim to a fraud incident
within the past year, an increase of 14 percentage points from just three years ago; and the
number of businesses suffering a financial loss as a result of fraud has also increased, from 64%
in the previous survey period to 69% this year. It also reveals three key trends that firms feel
more vulnerable to fraud; the globalization of business increases fraud risk; and the biggest
fraud threat to companies comes from within.
In many extreme cases, the responsible persons and what they have done are unforgivable.
Taken Bernard Madoff as an example, in his plea allocution, he claimed that he knew what
he was doing was criminal and he felt deeply sorry and ashamed. He was sentenced to 150
years in prison for turning his wealth management business into a massive Ponzi scheme that
lasted about 20 years and involved around $65 Billion. However, apart from these extreme
cases, “ordinary” fraud behaviors, such as overstatement of performance at work, return abuse,
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and office supply scams, are actually more frequency and pervasive. These kinds of fraud
behaviors are more acceptable and are hardly reported by any public media. Contradictory to
our common feeling that bad behavior is tied to bad character, or so called bad people do bad
things, unethical actions can also be committed by people who value and care about morality
but behave unethically when faced with an opportunity to cheat [55]. For instance, United States
retailers are losing $60 Billion a year to shrinkage in 2015, up from $57 Billion in 2014, and
employee theft is the single biggest cause of loss to retailers [86]. Another example is about
peer-to-peer music downloading. A survey conducted by Fred von Lohmann in 2004 claimed
that 88% of children between 8 and 18 years understood that peer-to-peer music downloading
is illegal and unethical, but 56% of the same children admitted to continuing doing so [90].
Although many companies are victims of fraudulent behavior, their attitudes toward fraud
are also twisted. A recent survey with more than 2800 senior executives from 62 countries has
found that a significant minority of executives continue to justify unethical behavior to improve
a company’s performance. When presented with a series of options, more than one-third would
be willing to justify inappropriate conduct in an economic downturn, while almost half would
justify such conduct to meet financial targets or safeguard a company’s economic survival [40].
The high percentage of managers that would help the company to hide or justify unethical
behavior to reach certain monetary targets is alarming for the societal welfare. Another survey
conducted in our first project with 138 owners of small and medium-sized businesses in the
US has obtained similar conclusions. Given the scenario that unethical customers might have
predominantly positive consequences for the retailer and for other customers, more than 80%
of respondents are fine with keeping the unethical customers [See Chapter 2 for detail].
Overall, unlike sensational fraudulent cases and huge corporate scandals, ordinary unethical
behavior, justified by normal people like you and me, or executives in various companies, is
more accepted and common than one thinks. Although received little attention by public media,
it has a tremendous impact on economics, marketing activities, as well as our daily life.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The definition of fraud and its related terms
will be given in section 3.2. After that, in section 3.3, we try to capture the most important the-
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ories and concepts in unethical behavior by reviewing literatures in standard economic, behav-
ioral ethics, psychology, and neuroscience in order to understand the causes and consequences
of fraudulent behavior. In section 3.4, we especially focus on studies in ordinary unethical be-
havior committed by ordinary people who care about morality. Furthermore, various statistical
fraud detection techniques are reviewed in section 3.5. We will then highlight the application
of network science in fraud detection in section 3.6. Possible managerial implications are dis-
cussed in section 3.7. Finally, in section 3.8, there is a brief wrap-up together with an outlook
on future steps at the end of the paper.
3.2 Definitions of fraud, cheating, dishonest, immoral, and
unethical behavior
Fraud, wrongful or criminal deception intended to result in financial or personal gain, comes
from Old French “fraude” and Latin “fraus” [101]. Fraud itself can be a civil wrong, a criminal
wrong, or it may cause no loss of money, property or legal right but still be an element of another
civil or criminal wrong [140]. Fraud can also be defined from psychological point of view, for
instance, Olsen has claimed: “Fraud is a human endeavor, involving deception, purposeful
intent, intensity of desire, risk of apprehension, violation of trust, rationalization, etc.” [110].
From a legal point of view, fraudulent behavior is prohibited in many countries. For instance,
the Article 146 of the Swiss Criminal Code indicates that “any person who with a view to
securing an unlawful gain for himself or another wilfully induces an erroneous belief in another
person by false pretences or concealment of the truth, or wilfully reinforces an erroneous belief,
and thus causes that person to act to the prejudice of his or another’s financial interests, is liable
to a custodial sentence not exceeding five years or to a monetary penalty. If the offender acts for
commercial gain, he is liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding ten years or to a monetary
penalty of not less than 90 daily penalty units” [130].
A synonym for fraud is cheating [102]. Cheating is committing fraud and/or deception
on a record, report, paper, computer assignment, examination, or any other course or field
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placement assignment [136]. Both fraud and cheating are different forms of unethical behavior
[42]. Unethical behavior is a much broader category of wrongdoing than fraudulent behavior
and cheating. For instance, Jones has described unethical behavior as behavior that is “either
illegal or morally unacceptable to the larger community” [73]. It is an action that falls outside
of what is considered morally right or proper for a person, a profession or an industry [143].
Therefore, unethical behavior is not necessary to be intended, which makes it different from
fraudulent behavior. As always mentioned together, dishonest and immoral are synonyms for
unethical [133].
3.3 Development of the research of unethical behavior
Without loss of generality, in this section, we will provide an overview on why people commit
unethical behavior. In literature there are two main research streams that try to explain the mech-
anisms of unethical behavior on an individual level [89]. The first research stream is referred
to as the standard economic perspective. It has its roots in the late Middle Age and reached
its zenith in the 20th century, especially in the field of crime and punishment, to explain when
someone commits an unethical act. In contrast to the purely economic view, there exists ample
evidence from other academic disciplines such as psychology, behavior economics and neuro-
science, that in addition to external reward mechanisms, there are internal reward mechanisms
that influence the individual decision-making process and behavior as well. Hence, parallel
to the standard economic perspective, a second major research stream, called the psychologi-
cal perspective, evolved in the second half of the 20th century. After these two main research
streams are reviewed, some insights from emerging approaches such as behavior economics and
neuroscience are examined.
3.3.1 Standard economic perspective
The standard economic perspective is rooted in the theoretical and philosophical concepts of
Thomas Hobbes and Adam Smith [71, 127]. This perspective assumes that a human being acts
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fully rational, selfish and maximizes its own payoffs. This rational human being – the so-called
homo economicus – knows always what he wants and is able to choose the best possible option
available. Becker transferred the idea of homo economicus to the area of crime and punishment
[18, 19]. In his model of the “economics of crime”, the goal was to minimize criminal acts
because at the time he wrote that theory, crime had grown rapidly and reduced social welfare.
He stated that crime could be decreased when the probability of being caught and the form
and size of the punishment are adjusted by the policy of the state. In addition, Becker already
noticed that crime could be effectively decreased with the certainty of being caught but not
with the size and form of the penalty. This finding is supported by experiments of Nagin and
Pogarsky in 2003 [98]. Allingham and Sandmo developed the model of Becker further and used
it to explain why an individual decides to evade taxes: If an evader gets caught at a certain time
period, all his preceding tax evasions are discovered as well. This, in turn, makes the evader
more risk averse [7]. This view on why people engage in tax evasion can also be applied in
the field of insurance fraud and in general for computing whether someone commits fraudulent
behavior or not [36, 43, 89]. For instance, an individual would consider only three external
factors when they would pass a gas station shop. First, the expected amount of money the
individual would gain from robbing the shop. Second, the probability of been caught while
robbing the station shop. And third, the magnitude of punishment if caught [89]. The decision
to commit the unethical act only depends on the expected external benefits (e.g. money gained,
or getting a better position at work) and the expected external costs (e.g. paying a fine, or losing
a job). Assuming the three above-mentioned external factors are known in the gas station shop
example, an individual chooses to rob the shop in case he gets a positive utility out of the act.
The decision-making process is a deliberate, conscious act made by the individual. However,
because the decision depends only on the external cost-benefit analysis, the individual’s internal
thoughts and processes itself have no influence on the outcome of his decision [90].
In the course of time, the standard economic perspective was incrementally extended. In the
field of crime and punishment theory, the economical perspective was extended with psycholog-
ical factors, because the assumptions of homo economicus were not sufficient to explain human
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behavior [70, 80]. Critics claim that given an opportunity to commit crime, individuals with
low self-control will do so [70, 128]. In the field of tax evasion, experiments give evidence that
subjects respond not only to probabilities as Allingham and Sandmo assumed [7] but also to
the context provided such as the perception of the fairness of tax system or trust in government
[126, 81].
An overview of articles mentioned in this section can be found in Table 12. The articles are
sorted based on appearance in the manuscript.
Table 12: Overview of the articles mentioned in Section 3.3.1: Standard economic perspective.
Paper Key points
Hobbes (1968), Homo economicus
Smith and Nicholson (1887)
Becker (1962, 1968) Introduce the concept of “Homo economicus” to the area
of crime and punishment
Nagin and Pogarsky (2003) Prove that crime could be decreased with the certainty of
being caught but not with the size and form of the penalty
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) Extend Becker’s model to explain tax evasion
Derrig (2002), Apply Allingham and Sandmo’s explanation in the filed
Farashah and Estelami (2014) of insurance fraud
Mazar and Ariely (2006) Describe a general way of computing whether someone
commits fraudulent behavior or not based on cost-benefit
analysis
Hirschi and Gottfredson (2001), Introduce psychological factors to extend “homo
Kleemans (2013), economicus”. For instance, low crime; self-control in
Smith (2004), perception of fairness in tax evasion
Slemrod (2007),
Kleven et al. (2011)
3.3.2 Psychological perspective
As has just been mentioned, from the psychological perspective, additionally to the external
cost-benefit consideration, other important psychological factors enter the consideration of an
individual when deciding to act (un)ethical [89].
Previous theories of ethical decision making in organizations have tended to emphasize
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either the individual or situational factors in explaining (un)ethical behavior [35, 138]. The
interactionist model from Trevino, however, tries to integrate both the individual and the situa-
tional factors that lead to certain behaviors [134]. This model is based on individual moderators
such as ego strength, field dependence and locus of control, and on situational factors such as
the imitate job context, organizational culture and the characteristics of the work.
Another important framework for the analysis of decision-making comes from Ferrel and
Gresham [51]. They present an integrated contingency framework explaining (un)ethical
decision-making with the help of 3 factors: individual factors (knowledge, attitudes), signif-
icant others (role set configuration) and opportunity (reward, punishment by policy makers,
code of conduct). An extended framework has later been presented by Jones who added that
the moral issue itself can also affect the decision-making process [73]. All three factors in this
integrated contingency framework influence the decision of an individual to behave ethically or
not. For instance, Shariff and Norenzayan showed that people who believe in a more fearsome
punishing God, than a compassionate one, cheated less in anonymous situations than others
[122]. Asch conducted experiments about conformity behavior in groups, while Milgram in-
vestigated the conditions that produce obedience to authority [10, 95]. With their experiment
“the good Samaritan”, Darley and Batson concluded that situational variables are significant
predictors of (un)ethical behavior [35]. The findings of Doris also support the hypothesis that
situational factors are even more important in predicting behavior than individual dispositions
[38].
Except for the above-mentioned two models, the moral development model is also an im-
portant theory in the decision-making process. The idea behind this theory traces back to Piaget
[107]. Kohlberg and Hersh later refined the theory further [82]. This theory is a model with 6
stages and 3 levels. The 6 stages are: (1) The punishment-and-obedience orientation, (2) The
instrumental-relativist orientation, (3) The interpersonal concordance orientation, (4) The “law
and order” orientation, (5) The social-contract, legalistic orientation, and (6) The universal-
ethical-principle orientation. And the three levels are: (1) Pre-conventional level, (2) Con-
ventional level, and (3) Post-conventional, autonomous level. The moral development model
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assumes that people can progress to a higher and more adequate stage of moral reasoning, if
they have the psychological capacity. The interaction with one’s environment is the key factor
of the development of moral reasoning. Not everyone will reach the highest stage namely stage
6 and hence, not everyone is able to judge ethically in a complex context and therefore, not
everyone acts the same way in ethical issues. The moral development model is extended by
Rest et al. [113]. It consists of 3 schemas: (1) the personal interest schema, (2) the maintaining
schema, and (3) the post-conventional schema.
In contrary to the moral development theory, the social cognitive theory states that behavior
is often determined by automatic processes. Therefore deliberative moral reasoning is not al-
ways needed. This theory is originally from Bandura [11]. It views people as interactive agents,
who are proactive, self-reflecting and self-regulating rather than just reactive organisms shaped
by external forces (environment).
An important concept in the social cognitive theory is self-regulatory, or self-control. Ac-
cording to Gino et al., self-control is the internal process that helps individuals to resist short-
term temptations and to achieve long-term goals [61]. It is also called “moral muscle” and it
can be depleted when individuals continue to exert self-control without rest [92]. A good ex-
ample to explain self-control, in the context of unethical behavior, is overstating performance at
the work place. Overstating performance offers individuals short-term benefits (e.g. monetary
gains) but at the same time it can cause long-term costs (e.g. bad reputation or lower social
acceptance). In such a dilemma, individuals have to weigh two opposing forces: the desire of
self-interested maximization and the desire to maintain a positive moral self-image [61]. Exper-
iments provided evidence that self-control depletion promotes unethical behavior and impairs
individual’s ability to recognize that their behavior is unethical [92, 61]. A lack of sleep could
diminish self-control, and in turn, reduces the inhibition of unethical behavior [14].
According to the social cognitive theory, moral reasoning – or in other words: what one
ought to do – is translated into actions by self-regulatory mechanisms. In the self-regulatory
process, individuals monitor their actions and judges based on their moral standards. If the
actions do not meet their internal moral standards, individuals regulate the actions through self-
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sanctions [12]. Internal standards emerge from a concept called moral identity. Moral identity is
the cognitive pattern a person holds about his or her moral character [9]. It is a powerful source
of moral motivation due to the fact that people would like to maintain self-consistency, or a
positive self-view [89, 9]. Furthermore, moral disengagement is a set of cognitive mechanisms
that cause a deactivation of moral self-regulation and allows people to make unethical decisions
more easily [37]. Based on the social cognitive theory, in the early stage of development of an
individual, behavior is largely regulated by external factors and social sanctions. Later, during
the course of socialization, individuals adopt moral standards that serve as an ethical guide and
are a major source for self-sanctions [12, 13].
Money has been found to play an important role in decision-making also [59, 60, 137]. For
instance, it has been shown in some experiments that the mere presence of substantial wealth
leads to perceptions of inequity among employees in an organization [60]. This perception of
negative inequity induces a feeling of envy and motivates individuals to commit fraud such as a
deceptive overstatement of performance at the workplace.
People sometimes behave unethically to benefit their group rather than for self-interests.
Recent results from experiments of Gino, Ayal, and Ariely show, if individual’s unethical be-
havior could benefit others, the level of individual cheating increased [56, 57]. Furthermore,
the level of cheating increased even if cheating only benefited the others and not the self. These
findings contradict the economic perspective, where only self-interested external rewards are
considered. Another study of Thau et al. reveals that employees who believed they were at risk
of social exclusion of the working group engaged more in pro-group unethical behavior than
others [132].
Except for the studies of ethical decision-making, there are other frameworks in understand-
ing the causes of unethical behavior. For instance, the fraud triangle framework explains the
motivation of an individual to commit fraudulent behavior with three elements: Perceived un-
shareable financial need, perceived opportunity, and rationalization of fraudulent behavior. This
framework originated from Donald Cressey’s hypothesis: ”Trusted persons become trust viola-
tors when they conceive of themselves as having a financial problem which is non-shareable,
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are aware this problem can be secretly resolved by violation of the position of financial trust,
and are able to apply to their own conduct in that situation verbalizations which enable them to
adjust their conceptions of themselves as trusted persons with their conceptions of themselves
as users of the entrusted funds or property” [34]. According to Ramamoorti, incentives and
perceived pressure motivate to commit fraud at the first place [111]. For example, an individual
has some financial problems that he is not able to solve through legal means, so he starts to con-
sider to commit fraud to overcome the pressure [3]. The opportunity includes the assessment of
being caught. The last element, rationalization of fraudulent behavior is the new element this
framework evokes. Since then, a large body of research has studied the concept of rationaliza-
tion [15, 131, 54, 65, 121]. The need to rationalize unethical behavior is rooted in the cognitive
dissonance. A cognitive dissonance emerges from the gap between the own perceptions of be-
ing ethical and the related unethical actions or behaviors one takes [52]. According to the “fraud
triangle” an individual most likely commits fraud, if he has a good motive/incentive and/or is
under pressure; if the opportunity of being caught is negligible; and if the fraudster is able to
rationalize his actions to himself [78].
Although the “fraud triangle” is a useful tool to examine why people commit fraud, critics
argue that pressure and rationalization cannot be observed empirically and important factors
like the capability of the fraudster is ignored [78]. To iron those faults out, many different re-
searchers expanded the “fraud triangle” from Cressey. Albrecht, Howe, and Romney introduced
the “fraud scale model” [6]. This model replaces rationalization through personal integrity be-
cause integrity can be observed and measured. Wolfe and Hermanson developed the “fraud
diamond model”, where they added the factor the fraudster’s capabilities [141]. The authors
believed that a lot of fraud would not have been committed, if the person did not have the right
capabilities. Dorminey et al. suggested a model called “MICE” [39]. This model replaces the
factor of incentives/pressure through MICE (Money, Ideology, Coercion, and Ego) that repre-
sents the motivation of the individual to commit fraud. The “New Fraud Triangle” suggested
by Kassem and Higson tried to combine all those more recent theories together into one model
[78]. This model contains four elements: Motivation (MICE model), opportunity, fraudsters’
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capability (fraud diamond model), and (4) personal Integrity (fraud scale model).
An overview of articles mentioned in this section can be found in Table 13. The articles are
sorted based on appearance in the manuscript.
Table 13: Overview of the articles mentioned in Section 3.3.2: Psychological perspective.
Paper Key points
Darley and Batson (1973) Situational factor in explaining (un)ethical behavior
Walker and Pitts (1998) Individual factor in explaining (un)ethical behavior
Trevino (1986) The interactionist model
Ferrel and Gresham (1985) The integrated contingency framework
Jones (1991) Add moral issue to Ferrel’s framework
Shariff and Norenzayan (2011), Valid the integrated contingency framework in
Asch (1951), Milgram (1963), Darley various experiments
and Batson (1973), Doris (1998)
Piaget (1932), The moral development model, including 6 stages
Kohlberg and Hersh (1977) and 3 levels
Rest et al. (2000) Add 3 schemas to the moral development model
Bandura (1989) The social cognitive theory
Mead et al. (2009), Experiments about relationship between self-
Gino et al. (2011) control and unethical behavior
Barnes et al. (2011) A lack of sleep could diminish self-control
Bandura (1999) Self-sanctions
Aquino et al. (2009) Moral identity
Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008) People would like to maintain self-consistency
Detert, Trevin˜o, and Sweitzer (2008) Moral disengagement deactivates self-regulation
Gino and Pierce (2009), Money plays an important role in decision-making
Vohs, Mead, and Goode (2006)
Gino, Ayal, and Ariely (2009, 2013) People might behave unethically to benefit their
group rather than self-interests
Thau et al. (2015) Employees’ pro-group unethical behavior
Cressey (1950) The fraud triangle framework
Ramamoorti (2008) Incentives and perceived pressure lead to fraud
Batson et al. (1997), Tenbrunsel Various researches about rationalization
and Messick (2004), Gino and
Ariely (2012), Gneezy (2005),
Shalvi et al. (2015)
Festinger (1962) Cognitive dissonance
Albrecht, Howe, and Romney (1984) Fraud scale model
Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) Fraud diamond model
Dorminey et al. (2012) The MICE model
Kassem and Higson (2012) New fraud triangle model
64
3.3.3 Behavior economic perspective
Behavior economics, in addition to the standard economics, also includes insights from psy-
chology for understanding fraudulent behavior [90]. Simon postulated that people might have
a bounded rationality instead of being fully rational [125]. He noticed that if we want to know
why people act like they do, in addition to the economical consideration, the complexity of the
environment and the limitations of the decision-maker itself have to be considered as well.
Tversky and Kahneman criticized the standard economic view including the expected utility
theory and presented the prospect theory. This theory integrates psychological mechanisms like
risk aversion/seeking in choices that involve gains/losses to predict behavior under uncertainty
[135, 75, 76].
Illustrative examples from the field of behavior economics, showing that not only economi-
cal external rewards are involved when people decide to act (un)ethically, come from Ernst Fehr
[50, 46, 49, 47, 45, 63]. Fehr and colleagues have demonstrated in several experiments such as
the ultimatum game, dictator game and public good game that many people are not only maxi-
mizing their own profit but also concerning about social comparison, fairness, and the desire to
reciprocate. For instance, in a one-time-only ultimatum game, the proposer offers the receiver
a division of the money and the receiver then has to decide whether he accepts the offer or
not. If the receiver rejects the proposed offer, both players go home without any money. From
the standard economic perspective, the proposer should favor himself and split the money un-
equally and the receiver would even accept the smallest amount possible, because it is still more
than nothing. However, in reality a majority of the offers are split equally, and many divisions
that are not divided equally are rejected by the receivers. These results show that individu-
als consider social utility and others’ outcomes rather than simply maximizing self-interested.
Henrich et al. investigated the behavior of individuals from 15 societies in 12 countries with
the ultimatum game [68]. The sample consisted of small-scale agriculturalist societies and no-
madic tribes. Two main results from this study support the hypothesis of internalized reward
mechanisms. First, the observed behavior varied fundamentally across societies. Second, the
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individuals’ preferences were not exogenous, as the standard economic model would predict,
but rather shaped by their society’s daily economic and their social interactions [90].
An overview of articles mentioned in this section can be found in Table 14. The articles are
sorted based on appearance in the manuscript.
Table 14: Overview of the articles mentioned in Section 3.3.3: Behavior economic perspective.
Paper Key points
Simon (1955) Bounded rationality
Tversky and Kahneman (1975), Prospect theory
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984)
Fehr and Schmidt (1999, 2001), Ultimatum game, dictator game, and public good
Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000, 2002), game: people are not only maximizing their own
Fehr, Fischbacher, and Ga¨chter (2002), profit but also caring about social comparison,
Gintis et al. (2008) fairness, and the desire to reciprocate
Henrich et al. (2001) Individuals’ preferences are not exogenous but
rather shaped by their society’s daily economic
and their social interactions
3.3.4 Neuroscientific perspective
Recent findings coming from the field of neuroscience give promising insights for further evi-
dence for the existence of internalized reward mechanisms. Neuroscience measures spatial and
temporal brain activity with the aim to get a better understanding of how the brain is work-
ing [24]. Through measuring brain activities, brain functions are inferred. Neuroscience has
made groundbreaking developments due to the rapid diffusion of brain imaging studies such as
positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) [90].
Research about fraudulent behavior or behavior in general focused for a long time on moral
reasoning. But later evidence suggested that moral judgment is more about emotion and in-
tuition than deliberate reasoning [67]. In neuroscience a substantial discussion aroused about
whether unethical behavior emerges by deliberate, controlled or automatic, intuitive cognitive
processes. The two competing theories are called “will” and “grace” hypothesis [66]. The “will”
hypothesis states that ethical behavior results from the active exercise of self-control, or active
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resistance of temptation. The “grace” hypothesis, on the other hand, states that honesty happens
in the absence of temptation, or more automatically and intuitively [1, 53, 142]. Abe and Greene
suggested reconciling the two different theories by demonstrating that the drivers of ethical be-
havior depend on the desirability of the reward. For ”grace” hypothesis, they conclude that
honesty flows automatically in presence of weak neural responses to anticipated rewards. For
”will” one needs to refrain from dishonest behaviors in cases of relative high neural responses to
anticipated rewards [1]. Experiments also showed that the cognitive control is mainly processed
by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex [48].
An overview of articles mentioned in this section can be found in Table 15. The articles are
sorted based on appearance in the manuscript.
Table 15: Overview of the articles mentioned in Section 3.3.4: Neuroscientific perspective.
Paper Key points
Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2005) Neuroscience measures spatial and temporal
brain activity with the aim to get a better
understanding of how brain works
Greene and Haidt (2002) Moral judgment is more about emotion and
intuition than deliberate reasoning
Greene and Paxton (2010), “Will” and “grace” hypothesis. “Will” states
Abe and Greene (2014), that ethical behavior results from the active
Fioretti and Marden (2015), exercise of self-control, or active resistance of
Xu and Ma (2015) temptation. “Grace” states that honesty
happens in the absence of temptation,
or more automatically and intuitively.
Fehr and Rangel (2011) The cognitive control is mainly processed by
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
3.4 Studies on ordinary unethical behavior
Early ethics researches focused more on what behavior is desirable by society and how people
should behave to fulfill ethical guidelines. Recently studies have shifted to a more descriptive
approach, where researchers try to understand why individuals cheat [121]. In this section
we will focus on the intentional and unintentional unethical behavior committed by ordinary
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people.
3.4.1 Why ordinary people engage in intentional unethical behavior
The research stream of ordinary people committing intentional unethical behavior generally
focuses on behaviors that people know to be wrong but still engage in [55]. In the other words,
researchers are interested in why and how do people rationalize their behavior.
Some studies suggested that people try to strive to enhance a positive self-concept and to
behave unethically only to a certain extend so that they can profit from wrongdoing while still
feel moral [88, 96, 121]. The experiments conducted by Mazar, Amir, and Ariely indicated that
people behave dishonestly enough to profit, but honestly enough to delude themselves of their
own integrity [89].
The framework of Shalvi et al. is an extension of the “self-concept maintenance” theory of
Mazar, Amir, and Ariely [89, 121]. The framework distinguishes between anticipated and expe-
rienced dissonance to identify different self-justification mechanisms that emerge either before
or after an unethical act is committed. Self-justification, or self-serving justification, helps peo-
ple to overcome the experienced or anticipated gap between their desire to profit by behaving
unethically and their view of themselves as being moral. In this framework the justification
that emerges before an unethical act is called pre-violation justification route. The authors have
identified three pre-violation justifications and three post-violation ones. The details of these
terms are explained below.
The first pre-violation justification is ambiguity. Situations where the norms or rules are
ambiguous are prone to pre-violation justification [15]. As demonstration for this mechanism
a dice-rolling experiment was conducted where the participants got more money for higher
numbers on the dice. In the experiment only the one who rolled the dice saw the outcome, this
eliminated the threat of being caught and made cheating legitimate to the individuals. When
people rolled the dice three times, they reported higher numbers for the first roll than when
they rolled the dice only once. This phenomenon emerged, because rolling the dice only once
needs lying by inventing a number that had not been observed. But when the dice was rolled
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three times instead of only once, it allowed participants to report a higher number for the first
roll because they maybe consecutively saw a higher number in the second and third roll and
transferred this number. Inventing facts is a clear violation to the individual whereas mixing up
or transfer facts are more ambiguous and easier to justify up-front [120]. It is also important to
mention that creative people are better in inventing facts, which allows them to use ambiguous
situations in a self-serving manner, even when they only observe one roll [54]. The self-serving
altruism is the second pre-violation justification to cheat. It can be applied when a lie causes no
harm to another person but benefits others. Furthermore, if the number of people who benefit
from one’s unethical behavior increase, altruistic cheating increases as well [57, 1]. Another
way how people can justify their unethical behaviors before committing them is by having
something like a mental account for recent pro-social behavior. Moral licensing, which is the
third pre-violation justification, works like a moral balance scale. If an individual recently did
a lot of moral actions then subsequent unethical behavior is more easily to justify.
The post-violation justifications are cleaning, confessing, and distancing. Cleansing is an
act where an individual is trying to liberate himself. The liberated act can be physical (e.g. pain
or religious fasting) or symbolic (e.g. washing hands). Confessing, either to a higher entity or
another person, helps people to reduce the feeling of dissonance. If an individual cannot clean,
deny or confess for the unethical behavior, they distance themselves from their unethical act
by pointing to others’ unethical deeds and using stricter criteria when judging others’ unethical
behavior.
To sum up the above-mentioned researches of ordinary people committing intentional un-
ethical behavior, mechanisms of rationalization, together with the pre- and post-justifications,
have bridged the inconsistencies between individual’s desire to behave ethical and the actual
immoral behavior. These mechanisms can help people to avoid the feelings of anxiety, guilt
or other negative emotions, or to protect one’s self-concept. It involves the justification of an
unacceptable behavior, thought or feeling in a logical manner to avoid the true reason for the
action [106]. Furthermore, these mechanisms prove that morality can be stretched individually
[55].
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An overview of articles mentioned in this section can be found in Table 16. The articles are
sorted based on appearance in the manuscript.
Table 16: Overview of the articles mentioned in Section 3.4.1: Why ordinary people engage in
intentional unethical behavior?
Paper Key points
Markus and Wurf (1987), People try to strive to enhance a positive self-concept and
Monin and Jordan (2009) to behave unethically only to a certain extend so that they
can profit from wrongdoing while still feel moral
Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008) Self-concept maintenance theory: People behave
dishonesty enough to profit, but honestly enough to delude
themselves of their own integrity
Shalvi et al. (2015), Self-justification theory, including three pre-violation
Batson et al. (1997), justifications and three post-violation justifications:
Shalvi, Elder, and Ambiguity, self-serving altruism, moral licensing,
Bereby-Meyer (2012), cleaning, confessing, and distancing
Gino and Ariely (2012),
Gino, Ayal, and Ariely (2013),
Abe et al. (2014), Gino (2015)
Tenbrunsel and Messick (2004) In intentional unethical behavior, people know what they
do is wrong and try to rationalize their wrongdoing by
self-justification to reduce ethical dissonance
3.4.2 Why ordinary people engage in unintentional unethical behavior?
As mentioned in the previous section, when individuals engage in unethical behavior, they do
it normally with intent. In this case, they know what they do is wrong and try to rationalize
their wrongdoing by self-justification mechanisms to reduce ethical dissonance [131]. How-
ever, sometimes people do behave unethically without even noticing that they crossed ethical
borders [55, 119]. This phenomenon is called bounded ethicality, a concept derived from the
bounded rationality of Herbert Simon [125, 30, 79]. People are exposed to systematic and pre-
dictable ethical blind spots, where they do not recognize the ethical dimension of their decisions
[119]. Unintentional unethical behavior cannot be captured fully by the “new fraud triangle”
from Kassem and Higson due to the fact that the reasons or motivations why people behave un-
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ethically is not always evident when people act unintentional [78]. Therefore, new framework
is indeed needed to explain this type of unethical behavior.
Sezer, Gino, and Bazerman identified three sources of unethical blind spots: Implicit biases,
temporal distance from an ethical dilemma, and decision biases that lead people to disregard
and misevaluate others’ ethical lapses [119].
Implicit bias is a cognitive process and explains how unconscious attitudes can lead an in-
dividual to act against his moral values. Some of this implicit biases are in-group favoritism, il-
lusion of objectivity, and the fairness of judgments are egocentric [93, 131]. For instance, many
elite U.S. universities favor so-called “legacy” students without being aware of it. “Legacy”
students are the children of alumni. This practice might prevent other ambitious students, also
those who are more qualified, from being admitted to these universities [17].
Another source of unintentional unethical behavior could be the temporal distance form
moral decisions. Individuals suffer from temporal inconsistencies. They tend to overestimate
the amount to which they will behave ethically in the future. Such forecast errors can be ex-
plained by the two opposing systems: The “want self” that wants immediate gratification, and
the “should self” that wants to make moral, long-sighted and responsible decisions [94]. Before
an ethical decision, an individual thinks it would behave in accordance with their “should self”
and this, in turn, would coincide with his or her moral self-image [89]. However, the “want self”
becomes dominant as soon as it is time to make the decision. The shortsighted profit becomes
much more salient while the longsighted, deliberative ethical choice fades away as closer one
comes to the decision [131]. After decision, when they evaluate their actions, individuals try to
reduce the dissonance they feel from the two opposing systems [96]. Taken in aggregate, these
findings suggest that temporal inconsistencies prevent us from being as morally as we actually
want to be.
The last source identified is the decision biases that lead people to ignore the immoral be-
haviors of others. Sezer, Gino, and Bazerman suggested several psychological mechanisms that
influence the amounts to which people ignore other’s immoral behaviors: The self-serving bi-
ases, the outcome bias, the presence of intermediaries, the gradual erosion of ethical behavior,
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and no specific, identifiable victims. Self-serving bias means that an individual is less likely to
notice, e.g. corrupt behavior of a co-worker if he can also benefit from the situation. The out-
come bias describes the phenomenon that we judge exactly the same behavior as more ethical
and worthy if it leads to a good outcome rather than a bad one. Furthermore, immoral behaviors
of others are judged less harshly if the fraudster influences another person, i.e. the intermedi-
ary, to carry out the decision. According to a phenomenon known as the slippery slope effect,
implicit biases prevent individuals from seeing gradual changes in their environment, including
the gradual deterioration of ethical behavior [58, 29]. In addition, people tend to judge uneth-
ical behavior far more harshly when it harms specific, identifiable victims than when it harms
a more anonymous group of people [62]. Together, these studies suggest that individuals ig-
nore others’ unethical behavior due to factors that have no particular relevance to the behavior’s
ethical content.
To sum up, the unconscious attitudes, the temporal inconsistencies between “want self” and
“should self”, and the ignoring of other’s unethical behavior are the sources of unethical blind
spots. With these blind spots, individuals are often not able to recognize the moral dimensions
involved in their decision-making processes and the judgments they make about the behaviors
of others, and are likely to commit unintentional unethical behavior.
An overview of articles mentioned in this section can be found in Table 17. The articles are
sorted based on appearance in the manuscript.
3.5 Overview of statistical fraud detection techniques
In previous sections, we review the most important theories and concepts in unethical behavior.
Fraud, defined as wrongful or criminal deception intended to result in financial or personal gain,
is one form of unethical behavior. However, fraud is different from ordinary unethical behavior
as it is about intentional use of deceits, tricks or some dishonest means to deprive another’s
money, property or legal right. Because of this, people have developed various methods to
counter fraud.
Fraud prevention uses different measures to stop fraud from happening in the beginning. It
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Table 17: Overview of the articles mentioned in Section 3.4.2: Why ordinary people engage in
unintentional unethical behavior?
Paper Key points
Chugh, Bazerman, and Banaji (2005), Bounded ethicality, which is a concept derived from
Kern and Chugh (2009), the bounded rationality of Herbert Simon
Simon (1955)
Sezer, Gino, and Bazerman (2015), Three sources of unethical blind spots to explain
Gino (2015) unintentional unethical behavior: Implicit biases,
temporal distance from an ethical dilemma, and
decision biases that lead people to disregard and
misevaluate others’ ethical lapses
Messick and Bazerman (1996), Implicit biases
Tenbrunsel and Messick (2004),
Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011)
Metcalfe and Mischel (1999), Temporal distance from moral decision
Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008),
Tenbrunsel and Messick (2004),
Monin and Jordan (2009)
Sezer, Gino, and Bazerman (2015), Decision biases that lead people to ignore the
Gino and Bazerman (2009), immoral behaviors of others: The self-serving
Chugh (2004), biases, the outcome biases, the presence of
Gino, Shu, and Bazerman (2010) intermediaries, the gradual erosion of ethical
behavior, and no specific, identifiable victims
focuses on identifying and stopping existing fraud. Its key measures apply in creating a culture
of honesty among people and organizations, create effective organization to minimize the risk
of fraud, eliminate any fraud opportunities and create a comprehensive approach to fighting
fraud.
Fraud deterrence deals with the causal factors of fraud. It is based on the assumption that
fraud does not occur randomly but rather happens when some circumstances are present. The
purpose of fraud deterrence is to fight against the root causes of fraud and what allows fraud
to occur. The distinction between fraud prevention and deterrence is that the former involves
identifying and stopping existing fraud whereas the latter focuses on eliminating factors that
may cause fraud.
Fraud detection acts if fraud prevention and fraud deterrence have failed. It is defined by
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diagnosing fraud in the fastest possible way once occurred. Obviously, the process of fraud
detection must always be carried on since the failure to prevent and deter fraud is not an exact
science with a definite result. It’s also an endless evolving process: No matter how efficient
one method might be to detect fraud, fraudsters will continuously find failures in the existing
system. Indeed, criminals constantly adapt their strategies depending on the level and number
of security barriers they have to cross. The main issue in developing new detection techniques
is that the transfer of ideas is scarce since it would allow the fraudsters to get access more easily
to valuable information to pass through the detection systems. Moreover, relevant real data
sets are usually really hard to get access to in order to test new methods. Most of the time,
companies prefer protecting their image rather than giving information about their exposure to
fraud. Since new fraudsters come every day, all the existing detection techniques, from ancestor
methods to the latest technologies, have to be applied since fraudsters might not be aware of all
of them [21].
Statistical fraud detection techniques are varied, but the main idea is always to compare
observed data with expected values. Depending on how the expected values are derived, there
are two main domains in fraud detection: supervised and unsupervised methods.
In the supervised domain, both fraudulent and non-fraudulent data samples are employed
to build detection models. It requires having both types of data and being sure about their
affiliation. Those techniques are efficient only in detecting frauds that already happened in the
past.
Traditional statistical classification methods, such as linear discriminant analysis and logis-
tic discrimination, have been proved to be effective tools for many applications [91]. The idea
of these methods is to find a linear combination of features that characterizes or separates two
or more objects or events. For instance, Chae et al. employed logistic regression model to de-
tect phantom transaction [26]. Phantom transaction is a kind fraud happening in online auction
due to the collusion of sellers and buyers. The auction is falsely reported as “completed” while
no item is actually exchanged. The creditor receive the money from the website whereas the
credit card company delay the settlement with the online auction because no money is received
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from the debtor. The authors showed that the use of “starting bid”, “auction length”, and “seller
credit” in a logistic regression model could be very helpful for detection of phantom transaction.
Neural network is an artificial intelligence algorithm. Although it’s sometimes referred to
as “black box”, in the sense that while it can approximate any function, studying its structure
won’t give you any insights on the structure of the function being approximated, it is a more
powerful tool than linear discriminant analysis. For instance, Altman, Marco, and Varetto com-
pared the performance of linear discriminant with that of neural network empirically [8]. Their
comparisons showed that: Neural networks are able to approximate the numeric values of the
scores generated by the discriminant functions; besides, neural networks are able to accurately
classify groups of businesses as to their financial and operating health, with results that are very
close to or, in some cases, even better than those of the discriminant analysis. Neural networks
are commonly used in telecommunication fraud due to their capacity for representing complex
and non-linear models and not having severe limitations and assumptions concerning the type
of input data. In subscription fraud related to fixed telephone lines, neural network have been
used as classifiers or predictive systems. As a classifier, a feed forward neural network was used
to classify subscribers as fraudulent [69]. As a predictive system, a multilayer feed forward per-
ceptron neural network was used to predict whether a new phone line correspond to fraud [41].
Regarding mobile phone detection, a bidirectional artificial neural network was able to predict
fraud comparing two unidirectional Artificial Neural Networks using time-series representing
individuals’ behavior [84].
Rule-based methods are algorithms that produce classifiers using various rules. For instance,
Clark and Niblett designed the CN2 induction system, which can effectively induct simple,
comprehensible rules in domains where problems of poor description language and/or noise
may be present [31]. A framework was proposed to detect superimposed fraud based on rules
[44]. Using this technique, indicators of fraudulent behavior are uncovered by using adaptive
rules in order to build monitors. Then those monitors are employed to give a description of
fraudulent behavior profiles and serve as input in the detection model. The detector constructor
network integrates all the different monitors generated through the user’s data on a daily basis
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and then detects a fraudulent behavior.
Tree-based methods have similar forms as rule-based ones. Decision trees are table of trees
shape with connecting lines to available nodes. Each node is either connected with more nodes
or a leaf node which defines a classification. There are two main types of decision trees. Clas-
sification tree analysis is when the predicted outcome is the class to which the data belongs.
Regression tree analysis is when the predicted outcome can be considered a real number. Those
classifiers, such as CHAID [77], CART [23], C4.5 [108] can work alone, in parallel or can be
combined together in order to create better detection performances. The combination of several
classifiers creates meta-classifiers and increases the detection accuracy [27].
On the other hand, unsupervised methods are used when there are no previous fraudulent
and legitimate observations that can be classified. The idea here is to model a baseline that
represent legitimate referential behavior and then try to detect observations that are significant
deviated from this referential. These observations are named as anomalies and outliers. The
advantage in unsupervised methods is to be able to identify frauds that were not discovered
before.
Peer-group analysis has been developed using behavioral fraud detection. It is a method
that enables the identification of accounts that behave in a different manner than others at a
certain point in time while they had the same behavioral previously [22, 72]. While peer-group
analysis implies a behavioral change of a certain account from others, break-point analysis
uses different transactions from a single card user. If a behavioral change of a single card is
identified, such as a sudden transaction of a high amount or a high frequency usage, then it
is flagged as “suspicious” [22]. Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a semi-supervised anomaly
detection technique. It is a stochastic model with a finite set of states. Each state is related with
a probability distribution. Transitions among those states are given under a set of probabilities.
Each state can be associated with an outcome depending on the probability distribution. The
HMM is initially trained with the normal behavior of a cardholder. Then, the cardholder’s
profile is assigned as low, normal and high spending based on their previous spending behavior.
Each cardholder is assigned with a set of probability regarding the amount of transactions. Any
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new transaction’s amount is affiliated within a category and compared to a defined threshold in
order to distinguish between fraudulent and legitimate transactions [129].
In the end, it’s worth to mention that various fraud detection techniques can be combined
together. For instance, a hybrid forecasting system was created to detect fraudulent financial
statements across firms [83]. The system is composed by decision trees, artificial neural net-
works, Bayesian networks, rules-learners and support vector machines. The stacking techniques
consist of combining all those methods together to increase the efficiency. An extreme outlier
elimination and hybrid sampling technique were proposed to counter skewed datasets in in-
surance claims [103]. K-nearest neighbors’ algorithm was used to detect extreme outliers and
a hybrid sampling was implemented to improve the detection accuracy. Panigrahi et al. pro-
posed a detection technique which includes the rule-based filtering, Dempster-Shafer theory,
and Bayesian learning [105]. Evidences from on rule-based filtering are combined and associ-
ated by using Dempster-Shafer theory in order to calculate a primary belief on each transaction.
Afterwards, Bayesian learning, which is a statistical tool updating previous behavioral pattern
to help the classification of a new transaction, provides a suspicion score to classify the trans-
action.
An overview of articles mentioned in this section can be found in Table 18. The articles are
sorted based on appearance in the manuscript.
3.6 Network science in fraud detection
Social networks analysis is a useful tool in fraud detection models. Observations or individuals
are usually represented as nodes, and the relationships among them are edges. There are various
tools which employ social network analysis in fraud detection. For instance, link analysis tries
to relate known fraudsters to other individuals by using record linkage [139]. In telecommu-
nication fraud, fraudsters are found to often call the same numbers from another account once
the previous account has been disabled for fraud [33]. Oddball algorithm, which was proposed
by Akoglu, McGlohon, and Faloutsos, can be used to detect anomalous nodes in (un)weighted
graphs [4]. The authors noticed that “egonets”, the induced sub- graph of the node of interest
77
Table 18: Overview of the articles mentioned in Section 3.5: Overview of statistical fraud
detection techniques.
Supervised methods
Paper Key points
Bolton and Hand (2002) A review of statistical fraud detection
Geoffrey (1992), Traditional statistical classification methods, e.g.
Chae et al. (2007) linear discriminant analysis and logistic
discrimination
Altman, Marco, and Varetto (1994), Use neural network as classifiers or predictive
Hilas and Mastorocostas (2008), systems in fraud detection
Estvez, Held, and Perez (2006),
Krenker et al. (2009)
Clark and Niblett (1989), Rule-based methods as classifiers
Fawcett and Provost (1997)
Kass (1980), Tree-based methods as classifiers
Breiman et al. (1984),
Quinlan (1993),
Chan et al. (1999)
Unsupervised methods
Paper Key points
Bolton and Hand (2001), Peer-group analysis as anomaly detection techniques
Hui et al. (2014)
Srivastava et al. (2008) Hidden Markov Model as semi-supervised anomaly
detection technique
Hybrid methods
Paper Key points
Kotsiantis et al. (2016) Hybrid forecasting system, including decision trees,
artificial neural networks, Bayesian networks,
rules-learners, and support vector machines
Padmaja et al. (2007) K-nearest neighbors’ algorithm is used to detect
extreme outliers and a hybrid sampling is
implemented to improve the detection accuracy
Panigrahi et al. (2009) Use rule-based filtering, Dempster-Shafer theory, and
Bayesian learning to classify new transactions
with suspicion scores.
and its neighbors, follow certain patterns in density, weights, principle eigenvalues, and ranks.
They then employed “egonets” to detect anomalies.
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Another worth-mentioning technique is NetProbe. NetProbe algorithm is an online auction
fraud detection system [104]. It shapes the auction website as a network composed by nodes
representing buyers and sellers and edges representing transactions. The concept is to deduce
properties of a single user by examining properties of other related users. Given this graph,
the likelihood of being a fraudster is calculated using the user’s immediate neighbors. This
model uses Markov random field to detect suspicious pattern in the network and then uses
belief propagation algorithm to localize fraudulent trades. Belief propagation algorithm is used
to perform inference on graphs. An incremental version of NetProbe was also created to quickly
update beliefs when the graph topology changes. In this version, new edge does not alter the
entire graph but changes the immediate neighborhood of an edge.
Community-based anomaly detection techniques have drawn a lot of attentions recently.
These approaches aim to find the graph objects, e.g. nodes, edges, substructures, and the pat-
terns of interactions that are rare and differ significantly from the majority of the reference
objects in the graph [5, 28, 117]. Varies community detection methods have been developed
to discover node partitions and can be applied to monitor the structural or contextual change in
every community [64, 32, 99, 112, 116, 109, 20, 87]. The descriptions of these methods as well
as the comparisons of their performances can be found in Chapter 4.
An overview of articles mentioned in this section can be found in Table 19. The articles are
sorted based on appearance in the manuscript.
3.7 Managerial implications of studies on unethical behavior
In this section we provide some practical advices for marketing managers on how to curb inten-
tional and unintentional unethical behaviors of their employees/costumers.
3.7.1 How to reduce intentional unethical behavior?
Before a manager starts to implement an action to curb cheating behavior, he should try to find
out whether the cheating behavior of the employees/costumers is caused by external rewards or
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Table 19: Overview of the articles mentioned in Section 3.6: Network science in fraud detection.
Paper Key points
Wasserman and Faust (1994), Use link analysis to relate known fraudsters to
Cortes, Pregibon, and Volinsky (2001) the other individuals
Akoglu, McGlohon, and Faloutsos (2010) Oddball algorithm, which employs “egonets”
to detect anomalies
Pandit, Wang, and Faloutsos (2007) NetProbe, which uses Markov random field to
detect suspicious pattern in the network, and
belief propagation algorithm to localize
fraudulent trades
Akoglu, Tong, and Koutra (2015), Various community detection algorithms can
Girvan and Newman (2002), be used in the community-based anomaly detection
Clauset, Newman, and Moore (2004), techniques in order to find the graph objects,
Newman (2006), e.g. nodes, edges, substructures, and the
Reichardt and Bornholdt (2006), patterns of interactions that are rare and differ
Rosvall and Bergstrom (2007), significantly from the majority of the reference
Raghavan, Albert, and Kumara (2007), objects in the graph
Blondel et al. (2008),
Leskovec, Lang, and Mahoney (2010),
Savage et al. (2014),
Chen, Hendrix, and Samatova (2012)
internal individual reward and/or punishment mechanisms [90]. If a manager ignores this first
step, he is likely to choose the wrong tools to curb cheating behavior and hence, effectiveness
would suffer.
The managerial intervention is simple, if the reason of unethical behavior lies only in the
greater external rewards than the costs of cheating. In that purely economic case, the manager’s
task should be to make the costs of unethical behavior larger than the expected rewards. This
can be attained by increasing the probability of being caught or by increasing the magnitude of
the punishment. The probability of being caught is much more effective than the severity of the
punishment [19].
If unethical behavior is caused by internal individual reward and/or punishment mecha-
nisms, then it gets more complicated and many tools can be applied depending on what’s the
internal reason of cheating. Firstly, a lack of internalized social norms could be the cause for
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unethical behavior [25]. In this case a manager should set up sessions or meetings to educate the
employees. The employees can internalize desirable social norms and rules, and consecutively
strengthen the internal reward mechanisms. Internalizing norms needs its time, and hence, is
a long-run tool to curb cheating behavior [90]. Experiments from the area of insurance fraud
claim that fraud detection systems have their limitations for customers who perceive a low de-
tection probability [43]. For such costumers, the limited success of fraud detection systems re-
inforces their intentions towards engaging in insurance fraud. They do not fear of being caught
but rather have internal mechanisms of justification. Therefore, it is also important to establish
moral norms, e.g. inform costumers about the negative societal consequences of insurance fraud
or state through advertisement that insurance fraud is a highly unethical act, rather than simply
increase the probability of being caught. Secondly, a short-run tool to reduce cheating behavior
is used if the cause of unethical behavior is a low moral identity (or lack of self-awareness). The
moral identity influences the way the internalized social norms are activated [12]. Therefore,
a manager should make use of contextual cues that increases the moral identity and boost the
activation of the internalized norms. One way to direct attention towards the moral identity is
to let the employees sign an “honor code” or a “code of conduct” [90, 123]. Another effective
way to activate the moral identity is to let people sign their names at the beginning of a paper
(e.g. an employment contract) rather than the conventional way of signing at the very end. This
increases moral identity right before it is needed most, which in turn, promotes moral behavior
[124]. Thirdly, if the unethical behavior is caused by self-deception, it is hard for a manager to
curb unethical behavior. Self-deception based on a self-serving bias is very stable and cannot
be changed by specific training or education. Therefore, the most effective way to reduce self-
deception is to eliminate the situations that lead to such biases. Such incentives/situations can
emerge if a manager does not establish clear and strict rules which have to be followed in the
organization [90].
Management courses usually teach that the performance of employees increases more when
specific goals are set rather than vague ones. Goal setting has become an important role in man-
aging employees’ motivation. Schweitzer, Ordo´n˜ez, and Douma conducted several experiments
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to study the behavior of overstating productivity [118]. They figured out that participant with
unmet goals did more often overstate productivity than participants who were told to do their
best. Furthermore, participants with unmet reward goals did more often overstate productivity
than participants with unmet mere goals. Their findings suggest that managers should set goals
carefully and especially set goals that are achievable for employees.
The last point to consider is the self-depletion issue. Self-control depletion is a source that
promotes unethical behavior [61]. When self-control resources are depleted, individuals don’t
have enough cognitive resources to recognize the moral dimension in the decision-making pro-
cess and hence, temptations to behave in an unethical way rise. Gino and colleagues suggested
that managers should try to remove temptations, to develop self-control, and to monitor indi-
viduals that are prone to be depleted fast (e.g. employees who are often interrupted at work).
Experiments conducted by Barnes et al. proved that a lack of sleep could diminish self-
control, which in turn reduces the inhibition of unethical behavior [14]. Implications for man-
agers are to create an organizational climate that is less stressful so that employees have more
and a qualitative better rest.
3.7.2 How to reduce unintentional unethical behavior?
Reducing the unintentional unethical behavior is a complex and difficult task because the per-
petrators themselves are unaware that they cross moral boundaries. Interventions that address
intentional unethical behavior are not always effective for unintentional unethical behavior as
well [144]. Sezer and colleagues presented two categories that help individuals to overcome
the underlying biases that lead them to commit unethical behavior: Moving from system 1 to
system 2 thinking, and strategies aimed at institutional design [119].
There exist two thinking modes in humans that can overrule each other depending on the
situation [74]. System 1 thinking is fast, automatic, emotional, intuitive and doesn’t need much
effort, whereas system 2 thinking is slow, deliberate, reason based, rational and needs much
more effort. Research has shown that system 1 is much more biased than system 2. If indi-
viduals are exhausted or tired, they rely on system 1. As system 1 is more biased, individuals
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are prone to commit unethical behavior [92, 61, 119]. Therefore, the managerial goal should
be to shift individuals thinking from system 1 to system 2. Managers’ interventions to achieve
this goal can be either changing the framing of the decision or giving individuals more time for
deliberate thinking, respectively taking away time pressure. Such interventions can reduce au-
tomatic, undeliberate decision-making and curb unethical behavior to a certain extent [67, 120].
Kern and Chugh found evidence in three experiments that individuals are more likely to behave
unethical if a decision is presented in a loss frame than if the decision is presented in a gain
frame [79]. Another useful tool for managers is to present their employees options in a joint
evaluation. Bazerman et al. argued that joint decision-making, which compares two or more
options simultaneously, is less emotive and more reasoned than separate decision-making that
thinks about one option at a time [16].
The second category mentioned above is “strategies aimed at institutional design”. Strate-
gies should be designed in a way that they can disclosure or eliminate conflicts of interests and
promote people toward more ethical choices. For example, signing an “honor code” and not
setting unrealistically high goals can change people’s incentives and tasks, and thus prevent
unethical behavior, while conflicts of interests stop auditors from making unbiased decisions
about their own clients in the auditing industry [97].
3.8 Conclusion and future steps
In the project, various articles from four different areas have been reviewed in order to gain a
deeper understanding of unethical behavior. Although from the standard economics perceptive
committing fraud does not have any internal costs, latest evidences from psychology and be-
havior economics suggest that individuals do have internal costs while committing fraud. These
costs emerge because the actions an individual undertakes, while engaging in cheating behav-
ior, are inconsistent with the internal ethical standards and moral principles. A growing body of
research points to the fact that not only there exist internal psychological costs while cheating,
but also that the costs are different among individuals. Therefore, as every individual might
have very different internal costs, there exists no universal formula to predict precisely whether
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an individual commits fraud or not in a certain situation. Moreover, due to self-serving biases
and bounded ethicality, people are sometimes not even aware of crossing ethical borders, and
hence there are not many possibilities to reduce such unethical behavior. Further development
in neuroscience might shed light on understanding the underlying mechanisms behind these
internal psychological costs, and this will help us to prevent, detect, and punish fraudulent be-
havior more efficiently. Under the current situation, we believe that the “new fraud triangle”
framework from Kassem and Higson [78] is a simple yet efficient tool to understand why in-
dividuals engage in unethical behavior. But it needs to integrate the mechanisms of ordinary
unethical behavior, especially the ones of unintentional unethical behavior in order to be more
complete.
We have also examined many different fraud detection techniques. The attempts to commit
fraud have drastically increased over the years, which make the field of fraud detection more
important than ever. Millions of dollars, euros and others currencies are lost every year as fraud-
sters keep on finding new failures in the existing systems. Different statistical fraud detection
techniques, such as linear discriminant analysis, neural network, rule-based and tree-based clas-
sification methods, anomaly and outlier detections should all be used as fraudsters might not be
aware of all of them. We would like to strengthen the fact that network science can be widely
applied in fraud detection, as it is a good tool to detect anomalies in both individuals and the
interactions between them.
Although some useful suggestions to reduce unethical behavior are proposed in the previous
section, managers will never be able to erase cheating behavior fully. To quote the words by
Bolton and Hand [21]: “Fraud can be reduced to as low a level one likes, but only by virtue
of a corresponding level of effort and cost.” Therefore, we would strongly encourage mangers
to employ different methods in a proper way in order to best detect and reduce the possible
unethical behaviors of their customers and employees.
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4 A Comparative Analysis of Community Detection Algo-
rithms on Artificial Networks5
Abstract
Many community detection algorithms have been developed to uncover the mesoscopic prop-
erties of complex networks. However how good an algorithm is, in terms of accuracy and
computing time, remains still open. Testing algorithms on real-world network has certain re-
strictions which made their insights potentially biased: the networks are usually small, and the
underlying communities are not defined objectively. In this study, we employ the Lancichinetti-
Fortunato-Radicchi benchmark graph to test eight state-of-the-art algorithms. We quantify the
accuracy using complementary measures and algorithms’ computing time. Based on simple
network properties and the aforementioned results, we provide guidelines that help to choose
the most adequate community detection algorithm for a given network. Moreover, these rules
allow uncovering limitations in the use of specific algorithms given macroscopic network prop-
erties. Our contribution is threefold: firstly, we provide actual techniques to determine which is
the most suited algorithm in most circumstances based on observable properties of the network
under consideration. Secondly, we use the mixing parameter as an easily measurable indicator
of finding the ranges of reliability of the different algorithms. Finally, we study the depen-
dency with network size focusing on both the algorithm’s predicting power and the effective
computing time.
4.1 Introduction
Relationships between constituents of complex systems (be it in nature, society, or techno-
logical applications) can be represented in terms of networks. In this portrayal, the elements
5Author Statement: This is a published work: Yang, Z., Algesheimer, R., & Tessone, C. J. (2016). A
Comparative Analysis of Community Detection Algorithms on Artificial Networks. Scientific Reports, 6; doi:
10.1038/srep30750. Zhao Yang is the 1st and corresponding author, Rene´ Algesheimer is the 2nd author, and
Claudio J. Tessone is the 3rd author.
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composing the system are described as nodes and their interactions as links. At the global level,
the topology of these interactions – far from being trivial – is in itself of complex nature [1, 2].
Importantly, these networks further display some level of organisation at an intermediate scale.
At this mesoscopic level, it is possible to identify groups of nodes that are heavily connected
among themselves, but sparsely connected to the rest of the network. These interconnected
groups are often characterised as communities, or in other contexts modules, and occur in a
wide variety of networked systems [3, 4].
Detecting communities has grown into a fundamental, and highly relevant problem in net-
work science with multiple applications. First, it allows to unveil the existence of a non-trivial
internal network organisation at coarse grain level. This allows further to infer special relation-
ships between the nodes that may not be easily accessible from direct empirical tests [5]. Sec-
ond, it helps to better understand the properties of dynamic processes taking place in a network.
As paradigmatic examples, spreading processes of epidemics and innovation are considerably
affected by the community structure of the graph [6].
Taking into account its importance, it is not surprising that many community detection meth-
ods have been developed, using tools and techniques from variegated disciplines such as statisti-
cal physics, biology, applied mathematics, computer science, and sociology. All these methods
aim at improving the identification of meaningful communities, while keeping as low as pos-
sible the computational complexity of the underlying algorithm. Clearly, these algorithms are
based on slightly different definitions of community, and therefore the results are not always di-
rectly comparable. Further, in most real-world applications, a ground truth – i.e. a unique iden-
tification of nodes to communities – is simply non-existent, which makes it even more difficult
to assess the reliability of the community detection procedures. To address these shortcomings
and test the algorithms’ reliability, different benchmarks have been developed.
Essentially, testing a community detection algorithm implies analysing computer-generated
or real-world networks with a well defined community structure (a known ground truth) in order
to obtain the community decomposition. One of the most used techniques is the GN benchmark
(for Girvan & Newman [3]), which is a special case of the planted l−partition model [7] with
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a prior specification of the number of nodes (128) and equally sized communities (4). When
the expected number of links joining a node to others in different groups is smaller than 8, the
four groups are strongly defined communities. In these conditions, a well functioning detection
algorithm should be able to identify the communities in reasonable time. Different commu-
nity detection algorithms can be compared based on their performances on the GN benchmark,
which has already been done by Danon et al. [8]. However, there are several drawbacks to the
GN benchmark: All nodes have the same expected degree, communities are separated in the
same way, and the network is of an unrealistic small size.
It is a well established fact that most real complex networks are characterised by largely
heterogeneous degree distributions [1, 2, 9] and heterogeneous community sizes [10, 11, 12].
For this reason, the GN benchmark cannot be considered as a good proxy for a real network.
By consequence, in a newer stream of research [5, 13], the authors proposed an alternative
benchmark, which is usually referred to as LFR (for Lancichinetti, Fortunato & Radicchi).
This method introduces power-law distributions of degree and community size to the graphs
to generalise the GN benchmark. The performances of most existing community detection
algorithms are good on the GN benchmark. In contrast, the LFR benchmark presents a harder
test for algorithms and makes it easier to unveil their limitations. It has been shown that the
mixing parameter, which is defined as
µ = ∑i
kexti
∑i ktoti
(3)
is the most influential parameter in the LFR benchmark graphs [14]. Here kexti and k
tot
i stand
for the external degree of node i, i.e. the number of edges connecting it to others that belong
to different communities, and the total degree of said node. Although it would be possible
to define a mixing parameter for each node, it is assumed that µ is a global property and is
the same for every node in the LFR benchmark. The reason here is to be consistent with the
standard hypotheses of the planted l-partition model [15].
According to the definition of community in a strong sense, each node should have more
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connections within the community than with the rest of the graph [16]. Therefore, for µ > 1/2
communities in the strong sense disappear. However, it is worth to mention that Lancichinetti
and Fortunato [15] found a weaker condition for community detection which can be applied to
any version of the planted l-partition model: µ < (N−nmaxc )/N, where N is the total number of
nodes, and nmaxc is the size of the largest community. In our study, although we stick to the strong
definition of communities, we have also taken the general condition of µ into consideration (see
Table 20).
In the following, we briefly review studies comparing community detection algorithms in
chronological order [8, 5, 13, 15, 14, 17, 18] to highlight the research interests shift. In one of
the early studies in comparing community detection algorithms, Danon et al. had tested ten al-
gorithms on the GN benchmark7 [8] and collected estimates of how time complexity scales with
network observables. However, the authors were not able to compare the actual computational
effort as a result of the small sizes of graphs. Later on, Lancichinetti et al. had employed the
LFR benchmark to measure the accuracy of two algorithms on undirected unweighted networks
without overlapping communities [5] and two algorithms on directed weighted networks with
overlapping communities [13]. Concurrently, the authors tested twelve different algorithms
on the GN and LFR benchmarks, and random graphs. For the tests on the LFR benchmark,
the authors had considered various parameters, including undirected unweighted graphs with
non-overlapping communities, directed unweighted graphs with non-overlapping communities,
undirected weighted graphs with non-overlapping communities, and undirected unweighted
graphs with overlapping communities [15]. Orman and Labatut later tested five community
detection algorithms on the LFR benchmark [14]. They measured the accuracy of algorithms
and studied the properties of the LFR benchmark graphs. Later, Peel applied two algorithms
on both weighted and unweighted networks with 100 nodes and examined the performance of
algorithms developed for weighted networks against those for unweighted ones for different
parts of the problem space [17]. Recently, Hric et al. compared the accuracy of eleven different
algorithms on both the LFR benchmark and a collection of real world graphs with sizes vary
from 34 to 5189809 nodes [18]. Overall, as an extension of the GN benchmark, the LFR has
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drawn a lot of attention: Early, researchers employed small artificial and/or real world networks
as benchmarks (e.g. the GN benchmark and the Zachary’s karate club network) ; while nowa-
days people shifted towards the use of large stylised large artificial or real world networks with
some kind of ground truth obtained from metadata information (e.g. the LFR benchmark and
the DBLP collaboration network [19]). However, as of today, a detailed study of the depen-
dency with the network size is missing as most of the existing studies include a few, selected,
set of values of the number of nodes and the mixing parameter, and do not consider the real
computing time needed to perform the analysis.
In this paper, we evaluate eight different state-of-the-art community detection algorithms
available in the “igraph” package [20], which is a widely used collection of network analysis
tools in R, Python, C and C++, on the LFR benchmark for undirected, unweighted graphs with
non-overlapping communities. Details of the algorithms can be found in the methods section.
Our contribution is threefold: First and foremost, we provide actual techniques to determine
which is the most suited algorithm in most circumstances based on observable properties of the
network under consideration. Secondly, we use the mixing parameter as an easily measurable
indicator of finding the ranges of reliability of the different algorithms. Finally, we systemati-
cally study the dependency with network size focusing on both the algorithm’s predicting power
and the effective computing time.
4.2 Methods
In this section, we first describe in detail the procedure to obtain the benchmark networks used,
then enumerate the community detection algorithms employed.
When comparing community detection algorithms, we can use either real or artificial net-
work whose community structure is already known, which is usually termed as ground truth.
Among the former, the celebrated Zachary’s karate club [28] or the network of American col-
lege football teams [3] have been extensively used. Among the latter, the ones used more perva-
sively are the GN [3] and LFR [13] benchmarks. However, obtaining real networks to which a
ground truth can be associated is not only difficult, but also costly in economic terms and time.
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Due to the complexity of data collection and costs, real world benchmarks usually consist of
small-sized networks. Further, since it is not possible to control all the different features of a
real network (e.g. average degree, degree distribution, community sizes, etc.), the algorithms
can only be tested – if resorting in this kind of graphs – on very specific cases with a limited
set of features. In addition, the communities of real world networks are not always defined
objectively or, in the best case, they rarely have a unique community decomposition. On the
other hand, artificially generated networks can overcome most of these limitations. Given an
arbitrary set of meso- or macroscopic properties, it is possible to generate randomly an ensem-
ble of networks that respect them, in what is usually called generative models. However, as
one of the most popular generative models, GN benchmark suffers from the fact that it does
not show a realistic topology of the real network [29, 5] and it has very small network size.
A recent strand of the literature on benchmark graphs tried to improve the quality of artificial
networks by defining more realistic generative models: Lancichinetti et al. extended the GN
benchmark by introducing power law degree and community size distributions [5]. Bagrow
had employed the Baraba´si-Albert model [9] rather than the configuration model [30] to build
up the benchmark graph [31]. Orman and Labatut proposed to use evolutionary preferential
attachment model [32] for more realistic properties [33].
The first step to generate the LFR benchmark graph is to construct a network composed of
N nodes, with average degree kˆ, maximum degree kmax and a power-law degree distribution
with exponent α by using the configuration model. Once this step is finished, each node has a
defined total degree. Then, given a power-law distribution of community sizes with exponent
β , a set of community sizes is drawn (between arbitrarily chosen minimum and maximum
values of community sizes that act as additional parameters). Nodes are then sequentially
assigned to these communities. The mixing parameter µ , which represents the fraction of
edges a node has with nodes belonging to other communities with respect to its total degree,
is the most relevant value in terms of the community structure. To conclude the generative
algorithm, edges are rewired in order to fit the mixing parameter, while preserving the degree
sequence. This is achieved keeping fixed total degree of a node, the value of external degree is
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modified so that the ratio of external degree over the total degree is close to the defined mixing
parameter. The LFR model was initially proposed to generate undirected unweighted networks
with mutually exclusive communities, and was extended to generate weighted and/or directed
networks, with or without overlapping communities. In this study, we focus on the undirected
unweighted networks with non-overlapping communities since most of the existing community
detection algorithms are designed for this type of networks. The parameter values used in our
computer-generated graphs are indicated in Table 20.
Table 20: Parameters of LFR benchmark graphs.
Parameter Value
Number of nodes N 233 ∼ 31948
Maximum degree 0.1N
Maximum community size 0.1N
Average degree 20
Degree distribution exponent -2
Community size distribution -1
exponent
Mixing coefficient µ [0.03, 0.75]
To deal with possible discrepancies in the network properties, we have randomly generated 100 net-
work for every set of parameters. Due to the slow computing speed, Spinglass and Edge betweenness
algorithms have been tested only on small networks with N ≤ 1000.
In this paper, we have evaluated the most widely used, state-of-the-art community detection
algorithms on the LFR benchmark graphs. In order to make the results comparable, and repro-
ducible, we use the implementation of these algorithms shipped with the widely used “igraph”
software package (Version 0.7.1) [20]. Here is the list of algorithms we have considered. For
notation purposes when giving the computational complexity of the algorithms, the networks
have N nodes and E edges.
Edge betweenness
This algorithm was introduced by Girvan & Newman [3]. To find which edges in a network exist
most frequently between other pairs of nodes, the authors generalised Freeman’s betweenness
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centrality [34] to edges betweenness. The edges connecting communities are then expected
to have high edge betweenness. The underlying community structure of the network will be
much clear after removing edges with high edge betweenness. For the removal of each edge,
the calculation of edge betweenness is O(E N); therefore, this algorithm’s time complexity is
O(E2N) [3].
Fastgreedy
This algorithm was proposed by Clauset et al. [12]. It is a greedy community analysis algo-
rithm that optimises the modularity score. This method starts with a totally non-clustered initial
assignment, where each node forms a singleton community, and then computes the expected
improvement of modularity for each pair of communities, chooses a community pair that gives
the maximum improvement of modularity and merges them into a new community. The above
procedure is repeated until no community pairs merge leads to an increase in modularity. For
sparse, hierarchical, networks the algorithm runs in O(N log2(N)) [12].
Infomap
This algorithm was proposed by Rosvall et al. [35, 36]. It figures out communities by employing
random walks to analyse the information flow through a network [17]. This algorithm starts
with encoding the network into modules in a way that maximises the amount of information
about the original network. Then it sends the signal to a decoder through a channel with limited
capacity. The decoder tries to decode the message and to construct a set of possible candidates
for the original graph. The smaller the number of candidates, the more information about the
original network has been transferred. This algorithm runs in O(E) [37].
Label propagation
This algorithm was introduced by Raghavan et al. [38]. It assumes that each node in the network
is assigned to the same community as the majority of its neighbours. This algorithm starts with
initialising a distinct label (community) for each node in the network. Then, the nodes in the
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network are listed in a random sequential order. Afterwards, through the sequence, each node
takes the label of the majority of its neighbours. The above step will stop once each node has the
same label as the majority of its neighbours. The computational complexity of label propagation
algorithm is O(E) [38].
Leading eigenvector
This algorithm was proposed by Newman [39]. The heart of this algorithm is the spectral op-
timisation of modularity by using the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the modularity matrix.
First, the leading eigenvector of the modularity matrix is calculated, and then the graph is split
into two parts in a way that modularity improvement is maximised based on the leading eigen-
vector. After that, the modularity contribution is calculated at each step in the subdivision of a
network. It stops once the value of the modularity contribution is not positive. Its computational
complexity of each graph bipartition is O(N(E +N)), or O(N2) on a sparse graph [40].
Multilevel
This algorithm was introduced by Blondel et al. [25]. It is a different greedy approach for
optimising the modularity with respect to the Fastgreedy method. This method first assigns a
different community to each node of the network, then a node is moved to the community of
one of its neighbours with which it achieves the highest positive contribution to modularity.
The above step is repeated for all nodes until no further improvement can be achieved. Then
each community is considered as a single node on its own and the second step is repeated until
there is only a single node left or when the modularity can’t be increased in a single step. The
computational complexity of the Multilevel algorithm is O(N logN) [40].
Spinglass
This algorithm was first proposed by Reichardt & Bornholdt [41]. It is based on the Potts model
[42]. The basic principle of the method is that edges should connect nodes of the same spin state
(community, in the current context), whereas nodes of different states (belonging to different
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communities) should be disconnected. Therefore, the aim of this algorithm is to find the ground
state of a spin glass model with a Potts Hamiltonian. Simulated annealing [43] has been used
to minimise the system’s free energy [44]. In a sparse graph, the computational complexity of
this algorithm is approximately O(N3.2) [45].
Walktrap
This algorithm was proposed by Pon & Latapy [46]. It is a hierarchical clustering algorithm.
The basic idea of this method is that short distance random walks tend to stay in the same
community. Starting from a totally non-clustered partition, the distances between all adjacent
nodes are computed. Then, two adjacent communities are chosen, they are merged into a new
one and the distances between communities are updated. This step is repeated (N− 1) times,
thus the computational complexity of this algorithm is O(E N2). For sparse networks the
computational complexity is O(N2 log(N)) [40].
We have employed virtual machines to implement all the computation. For each network
size and for each algorithm, a virtual machine is created using a pre-defined installation that
guarantees the same execution environment conditions. The installation is tuned to guarantee
that each virtual machine makes use of an entire physical node, and, at the same time, that
all physical nodes where the virtual machines will be hosted have the very same hardware
specifications. The workload distribution and collection for the results are commanded by a
master-slave approach.
4.3 Results
In this section, we compare the results of community detection algorithms in terms of accuracy
and computing time. The former is defined as a measure of similarity between the modular
structure generated by the LFR benchmark P (see Methods Section) and the partition iden-
tified by the respective community detection algorithms P¯ . The latter is the real computing
time needed to perform the community detection. This section is organised as follows: First, by
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employing the LFR generative model, we unveil the relationship between the mixing parameter
and the accuracy of the community detection algorithms. Accuracy is measured in two differ-
ent, complementary ways: The normalised mutual information [8], and the ratio between the
number of detected communities and the number of communities given by the LFR generating
model. Then, we measure the computing time of community detection algorithms and show the
relationship between the mixing parameter and the computing time. We then present the mixing
parameter as computed from the communities detected by the different algorithms as a func-
tion of the input mixing parameter. Last, we present the comparisons of community detection
algorithms in terms of accuracy and computing time as a function of network sizes.
4.3.1 The role of the network mixing parameter on accuracy and comput-
ing time
First, we study the accuracy of the community detection algorithms as a function of the mixing
parameter µ . To measure the accuracy we have employed the normalised mutual information,
i.e., NMI. This is a measure borrowed from information theory which has been regularly used
in papers comparing community detection algorithms [13].
Defining a confusion matrix N, where the rows correspond to the ‘real’ communities, and
the columns correspond to the ‘found’ communities. The element of N, Ni j, is the number of
nodes in the real community i that appear in the j-th detected community. The normalised
mutual information is then [8]
I(P,P¯) =
−2∑Ci=1∑C¯j=1 Ni j log(Ni jN/Ni◦N◦ j)
∑Ci=1 Ni◦ log(Ni◦/N)+∑
C¯
j=1 N◦ j log(N◦ j/N)
(4)
where the number of communities given by the LFR model is denoted by C and the number
of communities detected by the algorithm is denoted by C¯. The sum over the i-th row of N is
denoted Ni◦ and the sum over the j-th column is denoted N◦ j. If the estimated communities are
identical to the real ones, I(P,P¯) equals to 1. If the partition found by the algorithm is totally
independent from the real partition, I(P,P¯) vanishes.
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As pointed out in Ref. [21], the mutual information can be normalised in different ways.
These different normalisation methods are sensitive to different partition properties and have
different theoretical properties [21, 22, 23]. To get a better overview of the accuracy, we have
calculated the NMI by using all these five different definitions (cf. SI). We conclude that in the
current study different normalisation procedures provide qualitatively similar behaviours. Just
for the sake of brevity, and consistently with Danon et al. [8], we report in this section only
Isum (i.e. normalisation by the arithmetic mean). The results of the other NMIs are shown in
“Supplementary Information of Chapter 4”.
The results are shown in Figure 10. Each panel presents the accuracy of a given community
detection algorithm and is subdivided into two plots: The lower axis depict the average value
of NMI and the upper ones contain the standard deviation of the measures when repeated over
100 different network realisations. Most of the algorithms can uncover well the communities
when the mixing parameter µ is small, as it is apparent from the large values of I in the limit
µ→ 0. The accuracy of algorithms decreases, then, with increasing values of both network size
and µ . Different algorithms behave differently: the accuracy of Fastgreedy algorithm decreases
monotonically, in a smooth fashion and has a very small standard deviation along all the range
(Panel (a), Figure 10). Whereas that of Leading eigenvector algorithm falls rapidly even with
small value of µ (Panel (c), Figure 10). All the other algorithms display abrupt changes of
behaviour: their performances remain relatively stable before a turning point where the NMI
drops very fast as a function of µ . The changes of behaviour are usually around µ = 1/2,
which corresponds to the strong definition of community [16]. Interestingly, Label propagation
and Edge betweenness algorithms have turning points smaller than said value; while Infomap,
Multilevel, Walktrap, and Spinglass algorithms have turning points greater than µ = 1/2. We
have also noticed that for the Infomap algorithm the normalised mutual information has a point
of discontinuous behaviour at around µ ∼= 0.55. On the other hand, for Label propagation,
I vanishes around µ ∼= 0.5 falling in a continuous fashion. This supports the conjecture that
Infomap displays a first order phase transition as a function of the mixing parameter, while
Label propagation algorithm may have a second order one. Nonetheless, we have not performed
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an exhaustive analysis on the matter to systematically analyse the existence (or not) of critical
points. Further studies concerning the properties of these points are definitely needed.
Network size also plays the role here that a larger network size will lead to loss of accuracy
at a lower value of µ . For small enough networks (N ≤ 1000), Infomap, Multilevel, Walktrap,
and Spinglass outperform the other algorithms with higher values of I and very small stan-
dard deviations, which shows the repeatability of the partitions detected. Besides, the turning
point for accuracy is after µ = 1/2. For larger networks (N > 1000), Infomap, Multilevel and
Walktrap algorithms have relatively better accuracies and smaller standard deviations. Label
propagation algorithm has much larger standard deviations such that its outputs are not stable.
Due to the long computing time, Spinglass and Edge betweenness algorithms are too slow to be
applied on large networks.
Second, we study how well the community detection algorithms reproduce the number of
communities. To do so, we compute the ratio C¯/C as a function of the mixing parameter. C¯
is the average number of detected communities delivered by the different algorithms when re-
peated over 100 different network realisations. C is the average real number of communities
provided by the LFR benchmark on the same 100 networks. If C¯/C = 1, the community de-
tection algorithms are able to estimate correctly the number of communities. It is important to
remark that this parameter has to be analysed together with the normalised mutual information
because the distribution of community sizes is very heterogeneous. With respect to the networks
generated by the LFR model, for small network sizes the real number of communities is stable
for all values of µ , while for larger network sizes (N > 1000), C grows up to µ ' 0.2 and then
it saturates.
The results for the ratio C¯/C as a function of the mixing parameter are shown in Figure 11
on a log-linear scale for all the panels. The Fastgreedy algorithm constantly underestimates the
number of communities, and the results worsen with increasing network size and µ (Panel (a),
Figure 11). For µ / 0.55, the Infomap algorithm delivers the correct number of communities of
small networks (N / 1000), and overestimates it for larger ones. For µ ' 0.55, this algorithm
fails to detect any community at all for small networks and all nodes are partitioned into a single
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Figure 10: (lower row) The mean value of normalised mutual information depending on the
mixing parameter µ . (upper row) The standard deviation of the NMI as a function of µ .
Different colours refer to different number of nodes: red (N = 233), green (N = 482), blue (N = 1000),
black (N = 3583), cyan (N = 8916), and purple (N = 22186). Please notice that the vertical axis on the
subfigures might have different scale ranges. The vertical red line corresponds to the strong definition
of community, i.e. µ = 0.5. The horizontal black dotted line corresponds to the theoretical maximum,
I = 1. The other parameters are described in Table 20.
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community (Panel (b), Figure 11). The leading eigenvector algorithm slightly overestimates the
number of communities of small networks and the prediction worsens with increasing µ . More-
over, it underestimates the number of communities in large networks and even the behaviour do
not change monotonically with µ (Panel (c), Figure 11). The Label propagation algorithm is
able to deliver the correct number of communities with small values of µ regardless of the net-
work size. However, in the range 0.3/ µ / 0.6, it underestimates the number of communities
and the prediction worsens with increasing network size and µ . For µ ' 0.6, this algorithm fails
to detect any community and all nodes are placed into the same community (Panel (d), Figure
11). It is apparent that the Mutilevel algorithm constantly underestimates the number of com-
munities and such behaviour worsens with increasing network size and µ (Panel (e), Figure 11).
In Figure 11, Panel (f), for µ / 0.4, the Walktrap algorithm delivers the correct number of com-
munities regardless of network sizes, although the change of behaviour at which the prediction
is correct depends on system size. For µ ' 0.4, this algorithm behaves differently depending
on network size: it slightly underestimates the number of communities of small networks and
significantly overestimates it for large ones. For µ / 0.6, the Spinglass algorithm constantly
overestimates the number of communities, and its prediction worsens with network size. When
µ ' 0.6, it fails and tends to put nodes into a few giant communities (Panel (g), Figure 11). The
Edge betweenness algorithm is able to deliver the correct number of communities for µ / 0.4
regardless of network size. It overestimates C for µ ' 0.4 and the accuracy of the prediction
worsens with increasing network size (Panel (h), Figure 11). Overall, for µ / 1/2, Infomap,
Leading eigenvector, Multilevel, Spinglass, and Edge betweenness algorithms are able to de-
liver a reasonable estimator of the number of communities for small networks, while the number
of communities obtained by Label propagation and Walktrap algorithms are relatively close to
the real value regardless of network size. For µ ' 1/2, all the algorithms are much worse at de-
tecting the correct number of communities, and among all the algorithms, Multilevel, Walktrap,
and Spinglass algorithms have better outputs when the network sizes are small.
Third, we turn to the real computing time of the algorithms. This measure is usually repre-
sented in theoretical estimations as a function of the number of nodes and edges. However, the
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Figure 11: The mean value of the estimated number of communities delivered by different algo-
rithms over the real number of communities given by the LFR benchmark, i.e., C¯/C, dependent
on the mixing parameter µ on a log-linear scale.
Different colours refer to different number of nodes: red (N = 233), green (N = 482), blue (N = 1000),
black (N = 3583), cyan (N = 8916), and purple (N = 22186). Please notice that the vertical axis might
have different scale ranges. The vertical red line corresponds to the strong definition of community where
µ = 0.5 and the horizontal green line represents the case that C¯ =C. The other parameters are described
in Table 20.
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real computing time may be also affected by the structure of the network. Given the number of
nodes and a fixed average degree, we illustrate the computing time as a function of the mixing
parameter. The results are shown in Figure 12 on log-linear scale. Each panel presents the
computing time of a given community detection algorithm and it is subdivided in two plots: the
lower one depicts the average computing time, while the upper sub-panel contains the standard
deviation of the computing time when repeated over 100 different network realisations. Some
algorithms barely depend on the mixing parameter. This is not the case for Multilevel, Spin-
glass, and Edge betweenness algorithms (Panel (e), (g), and (h), Figure 12). There is a slight
dependency for Infomap algorithm that cannot be disregarded (Panel (b), Figure 12). The de-
crease of computing time for Infomap, Leading eigenvector, and Label propagation algorithms
(Panel (b), (c), and (d), Figure 12) are accompanied with the significant worsening of NMI and
C¯/C in Figures 10 and 11. Among all the algorithms, Label propagation and Multilevel algo-
rithms are much faster than the others (Panel (d), and (e), Figure 12), while Spinglass and Edge
betweenness are the slowest ones (Panel (g) and (h), Figure 12).
4.3.2 The observed mixing parameter
Unlike the number of nodes in a network, the exact value of the mixing parameter of a graph
is unobservable if ground truth is unavailable for the community assignment of nodes. In this
section, we study the mixing parameter delivered by the community detection algorithms µ¯ as
a function of the mixing parameter µ (see Eq. 3). The results of the different algorithms are
shown in the different panels of Figure 13. Each panel is subdivided in two plots: the lower
has the average computed value of µ¯ , while the upper sub-panel contains the standard deviation
of the measures when repeated over 100 different network realisations. All algorithms have a
linear (identity) relationship between µ¯ and µ except for the Leading eigenvector algorithm,
which overshoots the results (Panel (c), Figure 13). Most of the algorithms display a turning
point where the estimation of µ¯ breaks down. For the Fastgreedy, Multilevel, Walktrap, Spin-
glass, and Edge betweenness algorithms, µ¯ changes in a smooth fashion (Panel (a), (e), (f), (g),
and (h), Figure 13). For the Infomap and Label propagation algorithms, the estimated mixing
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Figure 12: (lower row) The mean value of the computing time of the community detection
algorithms (in seconds) dependent on the mixing parameter µ on a log-linear scale. (upper
row) The standard deviation of the measures on a log-linear scale.
Different colours refer to different number of nodes: red (N = 233), green (N = 482), blue (N = 1000),
black (N = 3583), cyan (N = 8916), and purple (N = 22186). Please notice that the vertical axis might
have different scale ranges. The vertical red line corresponds to the strong definition of community where
µ = 0.5. The other parameters are described in Table 20.
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parameter µ¯ has a steep change at around µ ∼= 0.55 and µ ∼= 0.5, separately (Panel (b), and (d),
Figure 13).
Overall, the mixing parameter obtained by the algorithms µ¯ fits well with the real mixing
parameter at small value of µ , but it differs from the real value with increasing µ . For certain
algorithms, the estimation fails completely for larger values of µ (Infomap, Label propagation),
and for the others it is either overestimated (Edge betweenness) or slightly underestimated (Fast-
greedy, Walktrap, Spinglass). Remarkably, in the Multilevel algorithm, the estimation is very
accurate for values as large as µ = 0.75 for all network sizes analysed.
4.3.3 The role of network size
So far we have only discussed the role of the mixing parameter µ to the accuracy and the com-
puting time of community detection algorithms. Now, as an important ingredient, we consider
the effect of network size. In our definition of the benchmark graphs, with a fixed average de-
gree, network size can be represented as the number of nodes in the network. The results are
shown in Figure 14 on a linear-log scale. Each of them presents the accuracy of a given com-
munity detection algorithms and is subdivided in two plots: one for the computed value of NMI
and the upped sub-panel contains the standard deviation of the measures when repeated over
100 different network realisations. Most of the algorithms can well uncover the communities
when µ / 0.2. In this case, the detecting abilities of Fastgreedy, Infomap, Label propagation,
Multilevel, Walktrap, Spinglass and Edge betweenness algorithms are independent of network
size (Panel (a,b,d-h), Figure 14). For Leading eigenvector, the accuracies decrease smoothly
with network size (Panel (c), Figure 14). For very large µ ' 0.75, most of the algorithms fail to
detect the community structure except for the Walktrap and Edge betweenness algorithms and
the accuracy barely depends on network size. In the intermediate region of µ , NMI is usually
decreasing with network size and µ .
Finally, we present the computing time as a function of the network size. The results are
represented in Figure 15 on a log-log scale. Each panel presents the computing time of a given
community detection algorithms and is subdivided in two plots: one for the measured value
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Figure 13: (lower row) The mean value of the mixing parameter estimated by the commu-
nity detection algorithms µ¯ dependent on the mixing parameter µ . (upper row) The standard
deviation of µ¯ dependent on µ .
Different colours refer to different number of nodes: red (N = 233), green (N = 482), blue (N = 1000),
black (N = 3583), cyan (N = 8916), and purple (N = 22186). Please notice that the vertical axis on the
subfigures might have different scale ranges. The vertical red line corresponds to the strong definition
of community where µ = 0.5. The green line y = x corresponds to the case which µ¯ = µ . The other
parameters are described in Table 20.
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Figure 14: (lower row) The mean value of normalised mutual information dependent on the
number of nodes N in the benchmark graphs on a linear-log scale. (upper row) The standard
deviation of the normalised mutual information dependent on N on a linear-log scale.
Different colours refer to different values of the mixing parameter: red (µ = 0.03), green (µ = 0.18),
blue (µ = 0.33), black (µ = 0.48), cyan (µ = 0.63), and purple (µ = 0.75). Please notice that the vertical
axis on the subfigures might have different scale ranges. The horizontal black dotted line corresponds to
I = 1. Due to the computing speed, Spinglass and Edge betweenness algorithms have been tested only
on networks with N ≤ 1000, and Infomap algorithm has been tested on networks with N ≤ 22186. The
other parameters are described in Table 20.
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Table 21: Indexes of the exponential function T ∝ Nα with the corresponding adjusted R-
squared values.
Fastgreedy Infomap
Leading
eigenvector
Label
propagation
α 2.048 [0.006] 1.421 [0.009] 1.123 [0.005] 0.959 [0.005]
R2 0.956 0.933 0.951 0.947
Multilevel Walktrap Spinglass
Edge
betweenness
α 1.126 [0.003] 2.04 [0.002] 1.282 [0.013] () 2.915 [0.005]
R2 0.957 0.962 0.867 0.884
The standard errors are listed in brackets. All the results are statistically significant at the significance
level of 0.05. Spinglass and Edge betweenness algorithms have been tested only on small networks with
N ≤ 1000, there might be some biases in the indexes of these two methods.
of computing time in second and the upped sub-panel contains the standard deviation of the
measures when repeated over different network realisations. In the log-log scale, there is a
significant linear correlation between the computing time and the network size. To further
compare the computing speed of every algorithm, we have fitted the curves according to the
exponential function T ∝ Nα . The fitted α together with the corresponding adjusted R-squared
values are listed in Table 21. Only algorithms with small α can be applied to large networks.
Overall, Label propagation algorithm is the method that scales best on network size; at the same
time, Leading eigenvector, and Multilevel algorithms also have reasonable computation speeds
on large networks. Fastgreedy, Infomap, Walktrap, and Spinglass algorithms scale much worse
than the previous ones, and Edge betweenness algorithm is only suitable for small networks
(with an almost cubic relation between network size and computing time).
4.4 Discussion
Traditionally, the aim of community detection in graphs has been to identify the modules by
only using the information encoded in the graph topology [4]. In this study we have performed
a comparative analysis of the accuracy and computing time of eight different community detec-
tion algorithms available in the “igraph” package. Each algorithm has been tested on a set of
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Figure 15: (lower row) The mean value of the computing time of the community detection
algorithms (in seconds) dependent on the number of nodes in the benchmark graphs on a log-
log scale. (upper row) The standard deviation of the computing time on a log-log scale.
Different colours refer to different values of the mixing parameter: red (µ = 0.03), green (µ = 0.18),
blue (µ = 0.33), black (µ = 0.48), cyan (µ = 0.63), and purple (µ = 0.75). Please notice that the vertical
axis might have different scale ranges. Due to the computing speed, Spinglass and Edge betweenness
algorithms have been tested only on networks with N ≤ 1000, and Infomap algorithm has been tested on
networks with N ≤ 22186 . The other parameters are described in Table 20.
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LFR benchmark graphs [5, 13]. The size of the benchmark graphs varies from approximately
200 to 32,000 nodes. With a fixed average degree, we have changed the structure of networks
by using different values of the mixing parameter µ .
In this study, the limited network sizes considered here pose no challenge for modern day
computers in terms of Random-Access Memory (RAM). Therefore, the memory consumption
is not analysed here. However, it is worth mentioning that the maximal memory consumption
could be crucial for larger scale networks: if one algorithm is implemented in a way that it needs
more memory for the optimal calculation, then it can easily happen that the process slows down
for large networks due to low available RAM, or it switches to a suboptimal implementation,
which needs less memory. A previous study showed [24] that (theoretically) many community
detection methods have minimum memory consumption needs that scale linearly with the size
of the graph O(2m+ 2n), where m is the number of edges and n is the number of nodes. In
practice, many of them need at least O(2m+3n) in case of unweighted undirected graphs and
when the Yale sparse matrix format is used [24].
Our results indicate that by taking both accuracy and computing time into account, the
Multilevel algorithm, which was proposed by Blondel et al. [25], outperforms all the other
algorithms on the set of benchmarks we have examined (although the modularity-based meth-
ods are known to suffer from the resolution limit of modularity [26]). We can further apply
the results in three aspects: First, since the computing time is not relevant for small networks,
one should choose algorithms based on their accuracies. Among all the algorithms, Infomap,
Label propagation, Multilevel, Walktrap, Spinglass, and Edge betweenness algorithms are able
to successfully uncover the structure of small networks when the mixing parameter µ is small.
With increasing value of µ , Infomap, Label propagation, and Edge betweenness algorithms’
accuracies drop for smaller values of µ than Multilevel, Walktrap, and Spinglass algorithms.
Second, for large networks, one should first choose algorithms which are able to detect the
organisation of nodes in a reasonable time. In this sense, Infomap, Label propagation, Multi-
level, and Walktrap algorithms are the a priori choices. After that, by taking the accuracy into
account, Multilevel is superior to the other algorithms as it displays a performance drop for a
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larger value of the mixing parameter µ . Importantly, the exact value of the mixing parameter
of a graph is usually unobservable. To get a rough idea about the value of µ , one may em-
ploy either the Spinglass or the Multilevel algorithm. Limited by the computing time required,
Spinglass algorithm cannot be applied on large networks.
Based on the previous results, and taking into account both factors, accuracy and computing
time, it is possible to suggest under which situations to use each algorithm depending sorely on
topological properties of the network under study. Our recommendations for the use of com-
munity detection algorithms are summarised in Figure 16. In the first region, µ / 0.5 and the
network size is small, N / 1000. There, most of the communities detection algorithms tested
give accurate results (and the computing time is affordable): Infomap, Label propagation, Mul-
tilevel, Walktrap, Spinglass, and Edge betweenness can all be used in a trustworthy fashion.
A second region has a relatively larger value of µ (0.5 / µ / 0.6), and equally small sizes of
network N / 1000. There, it is possible to use Multilevel, Walktrap, and Spinglass algorithms.
A third region encompasses again smaller values of mixing parameter (µ / 0.5) but an inter-
mediate number of nodes (1000 / N / 6000). In this region, the best choices are Infomap,
label propagation, Multilevel, and Walktrap algorithms. With increasing number of nodes in
the networks (6000/ N / 32000), Infomap and Multilevel algorithm are very likely to provide
the wrong number of communities and therefore they are no longer suitable in the fourth region.
The last region has the highest requirement for the community detection algorithms. None of
the algorithms performs very well in this region but the Multilevel algorithm outperforms all
the others.
Besides, we illustrate the suggestion for the adaptive use of the methods for community
detection process in a simplified flow diagram (see Figure 17). With any given network, one
should first employ either Spinglass algorithm or Multilevel algorithm in order to obtain an
estimate of the value of the mixing parameter µ . Notice that the former one can only be used
for small networks (N / 1000) due to the prohibitive computing time for larger network sizes.
Second, one can choose a suitable method according to the values of N and µ to conduct the
community detection such that both the accuracy and the computing time are acceptable. Third,
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Figure 16: Recommendation for the choice of adaptable community detection algorithms.
The x-axis is the mixing parameter µ and the y-axis is the number of nodes N. The y-axis is on a log scale
for better visualisation. The coordinates of certain important points are: A(0.48,1000), B(0.6,1000),
C(0.48,6192), D(0.36,31948), and E(0.42,31948). In different regions we would like to recommend
different algorithms, which are represented by different abbreviations: IM is the Infomap algorithm, LP
is the Label propagation algorithm, ML is the Multilevel algorithm, WT is the Walktrap algorithm, SG is
the Spinglass algorithm, and EB represents the Edge betweenness algorithm.
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Figure 17: Suggestion for the community detection process.
Small networks are those with number of nodes less than 1000, and small µ corresponds to µ / 0.5. To
be noticed that in the case that N ≥ 1000 and µ / 0.5, Infomap and Multilevel algorithms are no longer
suitable choices if N ≥ 6000.
as we have already shown, in certain situations, there might exist large standard deviations of
NMI, i.e., the community detection algorithms are not stable and therefore not reliable. Thus,
the value of µ¯ must be recalculated to get an idea of the repeatability of the results and confirm
its validity. In some situations, one might need to repeat the detection processes several times
or switch to another algorithm to ensure the validity of the community detection results.
Our suggestions have to be applied in conjunction with the concomitant research questions.
As a pure application of the recommendations could bias the results. Once a researcher has
decided to use a specific community detection algorithm, it is of crucial importance for her to
keep in mind the limitations and the expected validity of the output of the community detec-
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tion algorithm chosen. It is noteworthy that metadata would be helpful for evaluating network
community detection methods and can be used to improve the analysis and understanding of
network structure [19, 27]. In real-world networks where metadata is available, researchers
should also take into account the research question, the properties of the network, the interpre-
tation and meaning of the communities while choosing the community detection algorithms.
Different research questions together with the metadata might lead to different definitions of
community, and further change the ground truth of the network.
Compared to previous works on benchmarking community detection algorithms, our study
has many obvious advantages: First, we have considered networks which contain a wide spec-
trum of number of nodes and mixing parameters. Second, the algorithms we have tested are
integrated in a cross-platform package which has been widely used in academic research in net-
work science and related fields. Third, we have used the LFR benchmark graphs which have
shown more realistic properties than the earlier computer-generated networks such as the GN
benchmark.
There are also some limitations in our work: Although the LFR benchmark has generalised
the previous GN benchmark by introducing power-law distributions of degree and community
size, more realistic properties are still needed. We have mainly focused on testing the effects of
the mixing parameter and the number of nodes. Other properties, such as the average degree,
the degree distribution exponent, and the community distribution exponent may also play a role
in the comparison of algorithms.
In the end, we stress that detecting the community structure of networks is an important issue
in network science. For “igraph” package users, we have provided a guideline on choosing the
suitable community detection methods. However, based on our results, existing community
detection algorithms still need to be improved to better uncover the ground truth of networks.
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5 Summary and Outlook
This dissertation has looked into the topic of unethical customer behavior.
Without loss of generality, we discuss the causes of unethical behavior in Chapter 3.3 from
four different perspectives, i.e. the standard economic perspective, the psychological perspec-
tive, the behavior economic perspective, and the neuroscience perspective. We further discuss
the causes of ordinary unethical behavior, which is the unethical behavior committed by ordi-
nary people intentionally or unintentionally, in Chapter 3.4.
We probe the boundaries of the widely-held view about unethical customer behavior by
postulating that not all such behaviors are harmful, and further develop a theoretical framework
of retailer response to unethical customer behavior in Chapter 2.2. By applying the vector
autoregressive models on a longitudinal data from a Swiss online retailer in Chapter 2.3 ∼ 2.5,
we empirically prove that over longer time periods, the consequences of unethical customer
behavior could be positive to both other customers and the retailers.
Moreover, we briefly review existing statistical techniques in fraud detection in Chapter 3.5
and highlight the application of network science in fraud detection in Chapter 3.6. Eight state-
of-the-art community detection algorithms, which are the core of “community-based” anomaly
detection techniques, have been examined in Chapter 4. We have compared their performances
in terms of accuracy and computing time on the Lancichinetti-Fortunato-Radicchi benchmark
graphs in Chapter 4.3.
The implications of our studies on the causes and consequences of unethical customer be-
havior are provided in Chapter 2.7 and 3.7, and the implications of our study on the comparison
of community detection algorithms can be found in Chapter 4.4.
Research to come can be in different areas. For instance, how should retailers design/change
their user policies to lead to the best possible outcomes for both customers and retailers? Is
there a way to integrate the mechanisms of ordinary unethical behavior into the “new fraud
triangle” framework? Can we improve existing community detection algorithms or design new
methods to better uncover the structure of networks and further improve the performance of
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“community-based” anomaly detection techniques?
Nevertheless, we have to be aware of the ethical use of our finding in marketing as well
as in sociological perspectives. It’s indeed a challenge for companies and individuals to deal
with unethical customer behavior, especially in the cases that the consequences of the unethical
behavior are not negative.
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A Supplementary Information of Chapter 2
A.1 Identifying fraudulent users on the online shopping site
The cookie is typically a tagged string of text that contains data about the user’s visit to the
website. It flows between a user’s computer or mobile device and a web server. If cookie
caching has been enabled on the client browser in the user’s computer/mobile device, the client
browser will store the cookie in the hard drive. For our data source, disabling cookies may
lead to the situation that the online platform is not fully functional. The information generated
by the cookie about the use of the site includes: browser type and version, operating system,
referrer URL (the previously visited page), host name of the accessing computer (IP Address),
and time of server request. When registering for a user account on the site, the site requires
provision of personal data for successfully delivery of purchased products. This information
includes the customer’s first name, the last name, the address, the date of birth, and the email
address. Together with the data of the transactions with other accounts, the pseudonymous user
profiles are created. Cookies in web browsers are also widely used to manage login. A server
time stamp may be inserted into cookies indicating when they were created. This information
from the cookie can then be compared with other selected information about the user, device
and/or account to detect suspicious activities.
The retailer’s fraudulent detection procedure contains multiple layers as described in the
paper: the account check, the device check, the customer activity check, and most importantly,
the manual check [2]. Every account is checked based on their account information, followed
by the device information, and after that the historical behavior. The manual check, i.e., a phone
call by the retailer’s customer service representative, is the last layer in the fraudulent account
detection process.
A.2 VAR Model Specification
This appendix provides further information on the (1) lag-order selection, and (2) stability test.
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Lag-order selection
Many selection-order statistics are available to select the lag-order of VAR model. In this study
we compute four information criteria (FPE, AIC, HQIC, SBIC). The maximum lag order has
been set to 30. Two different versions of the information criteria have been applied [5]. Table
22 shows part of the statistics. In the end we set the lag order equals to 2 based on the selection
of AIC and FPE.
Table 22: Selection-order statistics. FPE, AIC, HQIC and SBIC are included.
Selection-order criteria (lutstats)
Sample: 31 - 506, but with a gap. Number of obs: 428
Lag FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
0 1.00E+46 105.48 105.48 105.48
1 1.30E+45 103.387 103.627* 103.994*
2 1.20E+45* 103.324* 103.804 104.538
3 1.40E+45 103.437 104.156 105.258
Selection-order criteria
Sample: 31 - 506, but with a gap. Number of obs: 428
Lag FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
0 1.00E+46 128.669 129.058 129.655
1 1.30E+45 126.576 127.205* 128.169*
2 1.20E+45* 126.513* 127.382 128.714
3 1.40E+45 126.626 127.735 129.433
Two different methods are applied, Lu¨tkepohl’s version of information criteria, and the normal version.
Endogenous variables: n PT t , n ST t , n Lt , n T t , f PT t , f ST t , f Lt , and f T t . Exogenous variables:
adspendingt , season1t to season3t , do fWk1t to do fWk6t , #dayst , and log(#days)t .
Stability of VAR model
To ensure that the VAR model is stable, we check the eigenvalue stability condition after es-
timating the parameters of VAR. If any of them exceeds 1 in modulus, some variables in the
model may require differencing. Figure 18 presents the results. As all the eigenvalues lie inside
the unit circle, VAR satisfies stability condition. The estimates of VAR model are stable and no
differencing is necessary.
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Figure 18: Stability of VAR model. Eigenvalue stability condition of the estimates of the VAR
model has been checked.
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A.3 Comparison of alternative VAR models
We compare the in-sample and out-of-sample fit of the VAR model with two alternative models
in terms of root-mean-square error (RMSE) and median absolute error (MAE). We reserved
the last 123 daily observations for a holdout test and re-estimated all models on the first 365
daily observations. Taken the normal accounts’ revenue as an example: First, an autoregressive
model (AR) captures the immediate effects of the other variables on normal accounts’ revenue
and the dynamic effect of past normal accounts’ revenue on current normal accounts’ revenue.
Second, an autoregressive-distributed lag model (ARDL) will add dynamic effect of each other
variable, without accounting for endogeneity and indirect effects among these variables.
AR model
The AR specification in Equation 5 relates normal accounts’ login activity to all the other vari-
ables related to fraudulent and normal accounts and controls for advertisement spending, time
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trend, seasonality, and lags of the dependent variable [1]. This equation includes the same vari-
ables as the VAR model (see Figure 3, Formula of the VAR model, for details), J is the number
of lags of the dependent variable (i.e. the term “autoregressive”).
ARDL model
In the AR model, we only capture the immediate effects of the other variables on normal ac-
counts’ revenue. To include dynamic effect specific to the other variables, we add lags of those
variables and make the following ARDL model [4]. This model includes the same variables as
the VAR model, J is the number of lags of the dependent variable. L, M, N, P, Q, R and S are
the number of lags for the predictor variables number of logins of fraudulent accounts, number
of proposed transactions of fraudulent accounts, number of successful transactions of fraudu-
lent accounts, amount of revenue of fraudulent accounts, number of transactions proposed by
normal accounts, number of successful transactions made by normal accounts, and number of
logins of normal accounts, respectively (See Equation 6 for details).
The comparison results in Table 23 have shown that: 1) In the out-of-sample comparison,
the VAR model produces much lower values for RMSE and MAE, indicating superior fit to the
data; and 2) in the in-sample comparison, AR model is slightly better than the other two models
in this case. It is mainly due to the fact that only the AR model has captured the immediate
effects of the other variables on normal accounts’ revenue while the ARDL and VAR models
are focusing on the dynamic effects.
n Tt = β1 f Lt +β2 f PT t +β3 f ST t +β4 f Tt +β5n PT t +β6n ST t +β7n Lt
+β8adspendingt +β9season1t +β10season2t +β11season3t
+β12do fWK1t +β13do fWK2t +β14do fWK3t +β15do fWK4t
+β16do fWK5t +β17do fWK6t +β18time trends+ intercept
+
J
∑
j=1
γ jn Tt− j + εt
(5)
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n Tt =
L
∑
l=1
β1,l f Lt−l +
M
∑
m=1
β2,m f PT t−m +
N
∑
n=1
β3,n f ST t−n +
P
∑
p=1
β4,p f Tt−p
+
Q
∑
q=1
β5,qn PT t−q +
R
∑
r=1
β6,rn ST t−r +
S
∑
s=1
β7,sn Lt−s +β8adspendingt
+β9season1t +β10season2t +β11season3t +β12do fWK1t +β13do fWK2t
+β14do fWK3t +β15do fWK4t +β16do fWK5t +β17do fWK6t +β18time trends
+ intercept +
J
∑
j=1
γ jn Tt− j + εt
(6)
Table 23: Comparison of VAR with AR and ARDL in terms of root-mean-square error (RMSE)
and median absolute error (MAE).
In-sample Out-of-sample
(1-365) (366-488)
Variable Models RMSE MAE RMSE MAE
VAR 77934.34 54210.83 58908.26 42466.5
n T AR 71999.5 51087.97 106921.37 92915.62
ARDL 77534.38 53966.82 73406.29 58260.5
A.4 Robustness check based on different definitions of fraud-
ulent accounts
We rerun the VAR model by using different definitions of fraudulent accounts. The aim of the
robustness check is to better validate our results.
Fraudulent accounts as those which have received the email and the in-
game warning message
In this part, we used the list of fraudulent accounts that received both the email and the in-game
warning message. There are 4,345 unique accounts on this list.
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In the figure 19, the blue curve shows the impact and the red dotted curves represent the
one standard deviation confidence interval for the impact. The x-axis is the number of days.
The y-axis is the number of login times. An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’
login times yields an increase of 105 login times on normal accounts’ login activity. The corre-
sponding elasticity is 0.0535. This positive effect decreases over time, disappearing in 2 days.
An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ number of proposed transactions yields
an increase of 105 login times on normal accounts’ login activity. The corresponding elastic-
ity is 0.0415. This positive effect goes to zero after 3 days. An unexpected positive shock on
fraudulent accounts’ number of successful transactions yields an increase of 104 login times
on normal accounts’ login activity. The corresponding elasticity is 0.0493. This positive effect
becomes insignificant in 2 days. An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ amount
of revenue does not yield any significant response on normal accounts’ login activity.
Figure 19: The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an unex-
pected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on normal accounts’ login activity.
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In the figure 20, the blue curve shows the impact and the red dotted curves represent the one
standard deviation confidence interval for the impact. The x-axis is the number of days. The
y-axis is the number of proposed transaction times. An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent
accounts’ login times yields an increase of 120 transaction times on normal accounts’ number
of proposed transactions. The corresponding elasticity is 0.0793. This positive effect decreases
over time and disappear after 3 days. An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’
number of proposed transactions yields an increase of 248 units on normal accounts’ number
of proposed transactions. The corresponding elasticity is 0.1274. This positive effect goes to
zero after 4 days. An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ number of successful
transactions leads to 201 more proposed transactions of normal account. The corresponding
elasticity is 0.1236. This positive effect lasts for 3 days before it becomes insignificant. An
unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ amount of revenue does not yield any sig-
nificant response on the number of normal accounts’ proposed transactions.
In the figure 21, the blue curve shows the impact and the red dotted curves represent the one
standard deviation confidence interval for the impact. The x-axis is the number of days. The y-
axis is the number of successful transaction times. An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent
accounts’ login times yields an increase of 35 transaction times on normal accounts’ number of
successful transactions. The corresponding elasticity is 0.0873. This positive effect decreases
over time and disappears after 5 days. An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’
number of proposed transactions yields an increase of 60 units on normal accounts’ number
of successful transactions. The corresponding elasticity is 0.1162. This positive effect goes to
zero after 4 days. An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ number of successful
transactions leads to 61 more successful transactions of the normal account. The correspond-
ing elasticity is 0.1415. This positive effect lasts for 4 days before it becomes insignificant.
An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ amount of revenue does not yield any
significant response on the number of normal accounts’ successful transactions.
In the figure 22, the blue curve shows the impact and the red dotted curves represent the
one standard deviation confidence interval for the impact. The x-axis is the number of days.
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Figure 20: The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an un-
expected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on the number of transactions proposed by
normal accounts.
The y-axis is the amount of revenue in 0.01 CHF. An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent
accounts’ login times, number of proposed transactions, and number of successful transactions
does not yield any significant response on normal accounts’ revenue. An unexpected positive
shock on fraudulent accounts’ amount of revenue yields an increase of 24,067 units in the
amount of revenue of normal accounts. The corresponding elasticity is 0.1475. This positive
effect becomes insignificant in about 2 days.
Fraudulent accounts as those which have received the email, the in-game
warning message, plus the termination message
In this part, we included only fraudulent accounts that received all three treatments – the email,
the in-game warning, and the termination message. There are 3,749 unique accounts on this
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Figure 21: The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an unex-
pected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on the number of successful transaction made
by normal accounts.
list.
In the figure 23, the blue curve shows the impact and the red dotted curves represent the one
standard deviation confidence interval for the impact. The x-axis is the number of days. The
y-axis is the number of login times. An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ login
times yields an increase of 94 login times on normal accounts’ login activity. The corresponding
elasticity is 0.0404. This positive effect decreases over time and disappears in 2 days. An
unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ number of proposed transactions yields an
increase of 105 login times on normal accounts’ login activity. The corresponding elasticity
is 0.036. This positive effect goes to zero after 3 days. An unexpected positive shock on
fraudulent accounts’ number of successful transactions yields an increase of 103 login times
on normal accounts’ login activity. The corresponding elasticity is 0.0417. This positive effect
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Figure 22: The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an unex-
pected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on the amount of revenue of normal accounts.
becomes insignificant in 2 days. An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ amount
of revenue does not yield any significant response on normal accounts’ login activity.
In the figure 24, the blue curve shows the impact and the red dotted curves represent the one
standard deviation confidence interval for the impact. The x-axis is the number of days. The
y-axis is the number of proposed transaction times. An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent
accounts’ login times yields an increase of 124 transaction times on normal accounts’ number
of proposed transactions. The corresponding elasticity is 0.0697. This positive effect decreases
over time and disappears after 4 days. An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’
number of proposed transactions yields an increase of 244 units on normal accounts’ number
of proposed transactions. The corresponding elasticity is 0.1094. This positive effect goes to
zero after 4 days. An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ number of successful
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Figure 23: The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an unex-
pected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on normal accounts’ login activity.
transactions leads to 197 more proposed transactions of normal account. The corresponding
elasticity is 0.1042. This positive effect lasts for 3 days before it becomes insignificant. An
unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ amount of revenue does not yield any sig-
nificant response on the number of normal accounts’ proposed transactions.
In the figure 25, the blue curve shows the impact and the red dotted curves represent the one
standard deviation confidence interval for the impact. The x-axis is the number of days. The y-
axis is the number of successful transaction times. An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent
accounts’ login times yields an increase of 36 transaction times on normal accounts’ number of
successful transactions. The corresponding elasticity is 0.0752. This positive effect decreases
over time and disappears after 6 days. An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’
number of proposed transactions yields an increase of 61 units on normal accounts’ number
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Figure 24: The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an un-
expected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on the number of transactions proposed by
normal accounts.
of successful transactions. The corresponding elasticity is 0.1016. This positive effect goes to
zero after 4 days. An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ number of successful
transactions leads to 61 more successful transactions of normal account. The corresponding
elasticity is 0.1199. This positive effect lasts for 4 days before it becomes insignificant. An
unexpected positive shock on fraudulent accounts’ amount of revenue does not yield any sig-
nificant response on the number of normal accounts’ successful transactions.
In the figure 26, the blue curve shows the impact and the red dotted curves represent the
one standard deviation confidence interval for the impact. The x-axis is the number of days.
The y-axis is the amount of revenue in 0.01 CHF. An unexpected positive shock on fraudulent
accounts’ login times, number of proposed transactions, and number of successful transactions
does not yield any significant response on normal accounts’ revenue. An unexpected positive
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Figure 25: The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an unex-
pected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on the number of successful transaction made
by normal accounts.
shock on fraudulent accounts’ amount of revenue yields an increase of 23,853 units in the
amount of revenue of normal accounts. The corresponding elasticity is 0.1223. This positive
effect becomes insignificant in about 2 days.
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Figure 26: The plots of the generalized impulse response functions for the impact of an unex-
pected change in fraudulent accounts’ variables on the amount of revenue of normal accounts.
A.5 The Ethics Position Questionnaire (Forsyth 1980)
1. People should make certain that their actions never intentionally harm another even to a
small degree.
2. Risks to another should never be tolerated, irrespective of how small the risks might be.
3. The existence of potential harm to others is always wrong, irrespective of the benefits to
be gained.
4. One should never psychologically or physically harm another person.
5. One should not perform an action which might in any way threaten the dignity and welfare
of another individual.
6. If an action could harm an innocent other, then it should not be done.
7. Deciding whether or not to perform an act by balancing the positive consequences of the
act against the negative consequences of the act is immoral.
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8. The dignity and welfare of the people should be the most important concern in any society.
9. It is never necessary to sacrifice the welfare of others.
10. Moral behaviors are actions that closely match ideals of the most “perfect” action.
11. There are no ethical principles that are so important that they should be a part of any code
of ethics.
12. What is ethical varies from one situation and society to another.
13. Moral standards should be seen as being individualistic; what one person considers to be
moral may be judged to be immoral by another person.
14. Different types of morality cannot be compared as to “rightness.”
15. Questions of what is ethical for everyone can never be resolved since what is moral or
immoral is up to the individual.
16. Moral standards are simply personal rules that indicate how a person should behave, and
are not be applied in making judgments of others.
17. Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations are so complex that individuals should
be allowed to formulate their own individual codes.
18. Rigidly codifying an ethical position that prevents certain types of actions could stand in
the way of better human relations and adjustment.
19. No rule concerning lying can be formulated; whether a lie is permissible or not permissi-
ble totally depends upon the situation.
20. Whether a lie is judged to be moral or immoral depends upon the circumstances surround-
ing the action.
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B Supplementary Information of Chapter 4
Different normalization methods for mutual information
The accuracy of different community detection algorithms can be evaluated by the normalised
mutual information [1]. As it has been pointed out by Vinh et al., there exist five different nor-
malised versions of the mutual information [2]: I joint (=
i(P,P¯)
H(P,P¯)), Imax (=
i(P,P¯)
max{H(P),H(P¯)} ),
Isum (=
i(P,P¯)
1
2 (H(P)+H(P¯))
), Isqrt (=
i(P,P¯)√
H(P)H(P¯)
), and Imin (=
i(P,P¯)
min{H(P),H(P¯)} ). Different nor-
malisation methods are sensitive to different partition properties and have different theoretical
properties.
In this “Supplementary information”, we show the effect of the mixing parameter and net-
work size on all five different NMIs and conclude that the results are similar to each other. In
the main text, we report the results of Isum [2], which is consistent with Danon et al. [1].
B.1 The role of the network mixing parameter on accuracy
In Figure 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31, we show the effect of the mixing parameter on I joint , Imax, Isum,
Isqrt , and Imin, separately. The detailed explanation of the plot Isum can be found in the main
text. Comparing different figures, we conclude that: (1) I joint provides the smallest values and
Imin provides the largest ones, and (2) all the NMIs display similar patterns.
B.2 The role of network size on accuracy
In Figure 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36, we show the effect of the network size on I joint , Imax, Isum, Isqrt ,
and Imin, separately. Comparing the different plots we get the same conclusion as before.
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Figure 27: (lower row) The mean value of I joint dependent on the mixing parameter µ . (upper
row) The standard deviation of I joint dependent on µ .
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Different colours refer to different number of nodes: red (N = 233), green (N = 482), blue (N = 1000),
black (N = 3583), cyan (N = 8916), and purple (N = 22186). Please notice that the vertical axis on the
subfigures might have different scale ranges. The vertical red line corresponds to the strong definition of
community where µ = 0.5. The horizontal black dotted line corresponds to I = 1. The other parameters
are described in the main text.
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Figure 28: (lower row) The mean value of Imax dependent on the mixing parameter µ . (upper
row) The standard deviation of Imax dependent on µ .
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Different colours refer to different number of nodes: red (N = 233), green (N = 482), blue (N = 1000),
black (N = 3583), cyan (N = 8916), and purple (N = 22186). Please notice that the vertical axis on the
subfigures might have different scale ranges. The vertical red line corresponds to the strong definition of
community where µ = 0.5. The horizontal black dotted line corresponds to I = 1. The other parameters
are described in the main text.
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Figure 29: (lower row) The mean value of Isum dependent on the mixing parameter µ . (upper
row) The standard deviation of Isum dependent on µ .
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Different colours refer to different number of nodes: red (N = 233), green (N = 482), blue (N = 1000),
black (N = 3583), cyan (N = 8916), and purple (N = 22186). Please notice that the vertical axis on the
subfigures might have different scale ranges. The vertical red line corresponds to the strong definition of
community where µ = 0.5. The horizontal black dotted line corresponds to I = 1. The other parameters
are described in the main text.
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Figure 30: (lower row) The mean value of Isqrt dependent on the mixing parameter µ . (upper
row) The standard deviation of Isqrt dependent on µ .
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Different colours refer to different number of nodes: red (N = 233), green (N = 482), blue (N = 1000),
black (N = 3583), cyan (N = 8916), and purple (N = 22186). Please notice that the vertical axis on the
subfigures might have different scale ranges. The vertical red line corresponds to the strong definition of
community where µ = 0.5. The horizontal black dotted line corresponds to I = 1. The other parameters
are described in the main text.
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Figure 31: (lower row) The mean value of Imin dependent on the mixing parameter µ . (upper
row) The standard deviation of Imin dependent on µ .
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Different colours refer to different number of nodes: red (N = 233), green (N = 482), blue (N = 1000),
black (N = 3583), cyan (N = 8916), and purple (N = 22186). Please notice that the vertical axis on the
subfigures might have different scale ranges. The vertical red line corresponds to the strong definition of
community where µ = 0.5. The horizontal black dotted line corresponds to I = 1. The other parameters
are described in the main text.
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Figure 32: (lower row) The mean value of I joint dependent on the number of nodes N in the
benchmark graphs on a linear-log scale. (upper row) The standard deviation of I joint dependent
on N on a linear-log scale.
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Different colours refer to different values of the mixing parameter: red (µ = 0.03), green (µ = 0.18),
blue (µ = 0.33), black (µ = 0.48), cyan (µ = 0.63), and purple (µ = 0.75). Please notice that the vertical
axis on the subfigures might have different scale ranges. The horizontal black dotted line corresponds to
I = 1. Due to the computing speed, Spinglass and Edge betweenness algorithms have been tested only
on networks with N ≤ 1000, and Infomap algorithm has been tested on networks with N ≤ 22186. The
other parameters are described in the main text.
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Figure 33: (lower row) The mean value of Imax dependent on the number of nodes N in the
benchmark graphs on a linear-log scale. (upper row) The standard deviation of Imax dependent
on N on a linear-log scale.
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Different colours refer to different values of the mixing parameter: red (µ = 0.03), green (µ = 0.18),
blue (µ = 0.33), black (µ = 0.48), cyan (µ = 0.63), and purple (µ = 0.75). Please notice that the vertical
axis on the subfigures might have different scale ranges. The horizontal black dotted line corresponds to
I = 1. Due to the computing speed, Spinglass and Edge betweenness algorithms have been tested only
on networks with N ≤ 1000, and Infomap algorithm has been tested on networks with N ≤ 22186. The
other parameters are described in the main text.
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Figure 34: (lower row) The mean value of Isum dependent on the number of nodes N in the
benchmark graphs on a linear-log scale. (upper row) The standard deviation of Isum dependent
on N on a linear-log scale.
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Different colours refer to different values of the mixing parameter: red (µ = 0.03), green (µ = 0.18),
blue (µ = 0.33), black (µ = 0.48), cyan (µ = 0.63), and purple (µ = 0.75). Please notice that the vertical
axis on the subfigures might have different scale ranges. The horizontal black dotted line corresponds to
I = 1. Due to the computing speed, Spinglass and Edge betweenness algorithms have been tested only
on networks with N ≤ 1000, and Infomap algorithm has been tested on networks with N ≤ 22186. The
other parameters are described in the main text.
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Figure 35: (lower row) The mean value of Isqrt dependent on the number of nodes N in the
benchmark graphs on a linear-log scale. (upper row) The standard deviation of Isqrt dependent
on N on a linear-log scale.
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Different colours refer to different values of the mixing parameter: red (µ = 0.03), green (µ = 0.18),
blue (µ = 0.33), black (µ = 0.48), cyan (µ = 0.63), and purple (µ = 0.75). Please notice that the vertical
axis on the subfigures might have different scale ranges. The horizontal black dotted line corresponds to
I = 1. Due to the computing speed, Spinglass and Edge betweenness algorithms have been tested only
on networks with N ≤ 1000, and Infomap algorithm has been tested on networks with N ≤ 22186. The
other parameters are described in the main text.
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Figure 36: (lower row) The mean value of Imin dependent on the number of nodes N in the
benchmark graphs on a linear-log scale. (upper row) The standard deviation of Imin dependent
on N on a linear-log scale.
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Different colours refer to different values of the mixing parameter: red (µ = 0.03), green (µ = 0.18),
blue (µ = 0.33), black (µ = 0.48), cyan (µ = 0.63), and purple (µ = 0.75). Please notice that the vertical
axis on the subfigures might have different scale ranges. The horizontal black dotted line corresponds to
I = 1. Due to the computing speed, Spinglass and Edge betweenness algorithms have been tested only
on networks with N ≤ 1000, and Infomap algorithm has been tested on networks with N ≤ 22186. The
other parameters are described in the main text.
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